“Japan, South Korea, and U.S. Alliance Politics in East Asia” (Junya Nishino and Sue Mi Terry seminar)

By Sophie Welsh

[Video link]

The development of North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities have emerged as one of the key security challenges in East Asia. At the same time, the relations between two U.S. allies—Japan and South Korea—has been marked by tensions due to historical and territorial issues.

In a panel discussion, Junya Nishino (Keio University) and Sue Mi Terry (Wilson Center) shared their perspectives on Japan-South Korea relations, North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities, and U.S. alliance dynamics.

Nishino analyzed several factors that have strained Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. In terms of domestic politics, there has been lack of trust between leaders in both countries, due to disputes related to the “comfort women” and wartime labor issues dating back to Japan’s colonial rule. Public opinion has also turned negative toward one another, especially among Japanese citizens who express pessimism about Japan-South Korea relations. The domestic political bases for both President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are relatively weak, and each leader is coping with low approval ratings.

 

Other driving forces are at play. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has destabilized the international system and China’s responses to it has created a lot of uncertainties. President Yoon’s foreign policy, which characterizes South Korea as the “global pivotal state,” shares key points with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” and suggests a potential for Japan-South Korea cooperation on global policy agendas. President Joe Biden has visited Tokyo and Seoul, and committed to revitalizing the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation. Donald Trump, his predecessor, showed little interest in such trilateralism.

With Japan and Korea forming the weakest link of the trilateral alliance, Nishino offered three recommendations. First, Japan and south Korea should restore their political channels, which have been declining under previous administrations, and build bilateral trust. Second, more effort should be made to form a strong and sustainable national consensus, especially in South Korea. It is encouraging that the Yoon administration has been making a strong effort to address the wartime labor issue, particularly regarding the wartime labor issue, but its low approval rating would make it difficult to persuade the public. Third, Prime Minister Kishida can show more appreciation to the Yoon government, by proposing tangible policy measures, such as lifting of export restrictions. These steps would broaden the bilateral political and diplomatic space and improve ties between Japan and South Korea.

Terry argued that policy to denuclearize North Korea over the past three decades has failed, and there should be no expectation that we would do better in the foreseeable future. The U.S. and its allies have consistently underestimated the durability, capability, and desire for North Korea’s nuclearization. North Korea has launched 31 missiles this year alone, including inter-continental ballistic missiles. It possesses new missile technologies, such as long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles and capabilities to disrupt U.S. missile defense systems.

North Korea has significantly increased its nuclear weapons stock. It is estimated to possess around 60 nuclear warheads today. By one estimate, five years from now (by 2027), North Korea could have 200 nuclear warheads. North Korea has the capability to miniaturize its nuclear warheads, is pursuing the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capacity, and is now focused on building tactical nuclear weapons.

North Korea is also threatening a preemptive launch.  While not a new threat, the renewed warning is ominous given that it envisions strategies beyond deterrence. According to Terry, this is straight out of Vladimir Putin’s playbook and his statements during the current war with Ukraine. North Korea has issued a new law on a first-use nuclear doctrine. The conditions that may trigger the first use now include not only an imminent nuclear attack, but also non-imminent and non-nuclear threats; when strategic assets are at stake; and when the North Korea leadership decides that it is operationally unavoidable. The wide-ranging nature of these conditions are deeply concerning.

North Korea is trying to cement its status as a nuclear weapons state, with the ultimate goal to decouple the U.S.  and South Korea and its alliance. If Kim Jong-un calculates that the U.S. lacks the willpower to defend South Korea, North Korea may choose to launch an attack.

Terry encourages South Korea to work with Japan and pursue trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. The key challenge is that the external environment continues to favor North Korea vis-à-vis the three countries, due to the continuing U.S.-China rivalry, Russia’s war in Ukraine that has led to closer Russia-China relations, and North Korea’s perception that nuclear weapons are more important than ever. For now, the trilateral cooperation mechanism lacks good options beyond deterrence.

The question & answer session led to a lively exchange of opinions, particularly regarding the possible areas for cooperation.  Dr. Terry suggested that Japan and Korea should “agree to disagree” for the present on the most sensitive topics, such as wartime labor, and focus on cooperation on the less sensitive, but more urgent matters at hand.  As areas for cooperation, Prof. Nishino cited economic security, especially supply chain issues; capacity building in Southeast Asia; and an effort to sustain a rule-based order in the Asia-Pacific.