THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF JAPAN’S BASE POLITICS: REGIONAL DISPARITY AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

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<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<td>JEES</td>
<td>Japan Elites and Equality Study</td>
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<td>JRP</td>
<td>Japan Restoration Party</td>
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<td>NKP</td>
<td>Komeito</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
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Introduction

How are the political attitudes formed of people who support the US-Japan alliance, especially the US military bases in Japan? This paper analyzes the political attitudes of such people as the micro-foundations of base politics in Japan, focusing on regional disparity and direct democracy regarding the US military base burden.

The US bases in Japan are the basis of the US-Japan alliance. Japan owes its national security to cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the US forces. The United States maintains global order through its overseas basing, and its influence in East Asia relies on its bases in Japan. The stable operation of US bases in Japan is necessary not only to maintain the US-Japan alliance but to sustain international order in East Asia.

After the Cold War, while the United States realigned its overseas bases, the salience of national security in Japan increased. The tensions in East Asia increased by North Korea’s missile and nuclear development, and China’s economic growth and foreign expansion. To these changes of international environment, Japan has been forced to take any response. Furthermore, Japan’s political reforms in the mid-1990s created a more national and central political structure.¹ After the electoral reform, the number of national security issues on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians’ electoral manifesto increased.²

However, under the nationalization and centralization of Japanese politics, the local residents who bear the US base burden have not been consistently supportive for the US military. One case in point is residents in Okinawa.

In September 1995, three US military personal raped a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa. A year later, the 1996 Okinawan Referendum was conducted on the Japan–US Status of Forces Agreement and reducing the US Bases in Okinawa. These process resulted in the realignment of US bases since the late-1990s, and brought some improvement in the concentration of bases in Okinawa. However, as of 2019, nearly 40 percent of the bases by number and 70 percent by land area were still located in Okinawa. Okinawan people have become more strident in their protests against the realignment which keeps the base burden in Okinawa. Their opposition efforts led, for example, to the 2019 Okinawan Referendum on the reclamation of Henoko Bay to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Its turnout rate was 52.48 percent, of which more than 70 percent disagreed with the reclamation.

To understand the relationship between increasing salience of national security and local protests, this paper studies the political attitudes of Japanese people using a behavioral approach. Its focus is on regional disparity and direct democracy involved in policymaking in connection with Japan’s national security. This paper contributes showing the micro-foundations of base politics in Japan, as well as studying foreign policy including the US bases overseas with behavioral approach in comparative perspective.

This paper consists of two empirical studies. Study 1 analyzes multi-leveled political attitudes toward the unequal base burden, comparing the attitudes of Japanese citizens, including the elites of various sector, the national mass, and the local residents of Okinawa. This comparative study will find that overall, most people are aware of the disproportionate burden on locals caused by regionally unequal basing, but supporting the US-Japan alliance justifies the regional disproportion. Study 2 analyzes politics of direct democracy—local citizens’ recourses

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when they feel that nationally representative democracy does not represent them—using the 2019 Okinawan Referendum as a case. This study will find that party politics affects voters’ preference formation and voting behavior through controlling the ballot design.

**Research on Base Politics**

Before conducting two empirical studies, this section reviews the existing studies on base politics. As followed, research on overseas basing was developed by two generations. The more recent studies have begun to use individual and behavioral approaches.

*Military Bases Overseas*

After World War II, the number of overseas military bases increased as a consequence of alliances among sovereign states.\(^4\) The US in 2018, for example, had 514 bases in 45 foreign countries according to a US Department of Defense report, most of them being in Germany (194 sites), Japan (121 sites), and South Korea (83 sites).\(^5\)

Research on overseas basing was developed by two generations\(^6\). The first generation studied the Cold War period from the perspective of macro-historical studies. The second generation studied the post-Cold War period from the perspective of actual politics on overseas bases. Furthermore, recent studies explored the period before and during the Cold War from the

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second-generation perspective. This paper is also belong to the second generation, studying the post-Cold War period from the perspective of actual politics.

Bases Politics Overview

Base politics is defined as “the interplay between basing nations and host nations on affairs relating to the operation of local military facilities in host nations,” as Geoffrey F. Gresh’s definition. To understand the interplay between basing and host nations, studies on base politics conducted various case studies using published and unpublished sources as well as interviews. The case studies show that the dynamics of base politics depends on those contexts. Kent E. Calder pointed out that political changes in host countries, especially in emerging democracies, make the US bases vulnerable, and showed that the US bases tended to be more acceptable when they are associated with the political liberation of that country. Alexander Cooley showed through paired case studies that the domestic politics of host countries, particularly the status of US bases during democratic transitions, affect the extent to which the US forces consisted of a part of the host countries. More recent studies explored Latin-American and Middle-Eastern cases.

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Within various contexts of base politics, this paper refers to studies of protest movements as a social context. The chapters in the volume edited by Catherine Lutz and Cynthia Enlow focused on the people living close to military bases, the impact of living under the bases’ shadow, and described the social movements in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.\(^\text{12}\) Yuko Kawato studied social movements in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, and showed the conditions under which the arguments of protesters persuade elites, and the ways how protesters create incentives for elites.\(^\text{13}\) These studies show that the impact of protest movements as well as base politics depends on the context of host countries.

Regarding the interplay between basing and host nations and the protest movements in host countries, Andrew Yeo combined international relations and social movement perspectives and examined the impact of protest movements as well as the effect of alliance on the outcome of movements. He conducted interviews with activists, politicians, policymakers, and the US officials in the Philippines, Okinawa, Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea. The attitude of elites in the host government regarding security and foreign policy posed as political opportunities and barriers to protest movements.\(^\text{14}\) As well as Yeo, this paper focuses on the interaction between elites and society.


Individual Attitudes as Micro-Foundations

However, the existing base politics studies, except for some recent studies, has a limitation that have been less studied individual attitudes toward the US bases. In other words, the micro-foundations are lacked to discuss the macro phenomena of overseas basing.

An exceptional study focusing on individual attitudes is Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Alissandra T. Stoyan’s study in Peru. They examined the effect of US military deployments on mass attitudes toward the US military and government in Peru using survey data and collected subnational data on deployments. They found that the deployments improve mass perceptions of the US military and government and correlate with positive assessments of the US influence.15

Another exceptional study is an international comparison by Michel A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Starvers. They examined the effect of different forms of exposure to the US military presence on the mass attitudes toward the US military, government, and people using cross-national survey data from 14 countries. They found a correlation between contact with the US military personnel or receiving economic benefits from the US presence with support for the US presence, people, and government.16

These studies are critically significant regarding exploration of the micro-foundations of base politics. However, they have three limitations. Firstly, they disregard the regional disparities of basing within host countries. The concentration of costs for military bases might result in the regionally variation of public attitudes toward the bases.17 Secondly, they do not compare the

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mass attitudes toward the elite attitudes. The gap between elites and public mass around base politics should be explored as well as representative democracy or foreign policy analysis.\textsuperscript{18} Thirdly, they do not consider the impact of elites on mass attitudes toward the US bases in host countries. Mass attitudes are affected by cues from the elites as a factor of the informational environment surrounding people.\textsuperscript{19} In sum, existing studies have disregarded the interactions between elites, masses and local residents, put them in a black box, and have not provided sufficient empirical evidences.

In contrast, this paper sheds light on the interactions between elites, national mass, and local residents. Firstly, it explores the variations of attitudes toward the US military between the regions with heavier base burdens and the national masses. Secondly, it explores the micro-foundations of elites along with the national mass. Thirdly, it considers that the elites who support the US bases may attempt to mellow anti-US military attitudes. Thus, this paper will contribute to clarifying the interactions between elites, national mass, and local residents as the micro-foundations of base politics.

\textbf{Research Design}

Considering above three limitations of existing studies, this paper conducts two empirical studies using observable survey data, focusing on Okinawa, the most southern and western prefecture in Japan. Study 1 compares how the elites, the national mass, and the local residents of Okinawa all regard the disproportion in the US base burden, responding to the first and second


limitations. Study 2 analyzes the effect of party politics on citizens’ preference formation in the 2019 Okinawan referendum, responding to the third limitation.

**Study 1: Attitudes toward the Disproportion in Base Burden**

Study 1 focuses on regional disproportion in the US bases. Table 1-1 shows the changes in area and number of the US bases in Japan. The reduction in Okinawa is more rapid in number but more modest in area than other regions. Certainly, in December 1998 under the Hashimoto administration, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) released the final report, “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.”

Nevertheless, there is no consensus between national elites and local protests so far that the overburden of US bases on Okinawa has been eliminated.

A recent critical case is relocating the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Since the SACO final report, almost 15 years was spent for deliberating on the site and method to construct the replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station. The Hatoyama administration tried to relocate it to other prefecture than Okinawa, though abandoned the plan in May 2010. In December 2013, under the second Abe administration, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Hirokazu Nakaima approved the reclamation of Henoko Bay to build a replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station. Thus, the construction at Henoko Bay begun. Nevertheless, the Okinawan Prefectural Referendum on the reclamation in Henoko Bay was conducted in February 2019.

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To understand these gaps between national policy and local protests, Study 1 compares the elites of various sectors, the national mass, and the local residents in Okinawa. It explores two questions regarding regional disproportion in the US base burden. Firstly, how do they perceive that regional distribution of US bases in Japan? The analysis will show that some of the people who recognize the regional disproportion justified the burden in Okinawa. Secondly, how do they justify the regional disproportion in US base? The analysis will show that non-partisan support for the US-Japan alliance as well as partisan conservativeness result in justifying the US base burden.

Study 2: Effect of Party Politics on Direct Democracy

Study 2 focuses on the effect of party politics on direct democracy regarding the US bases in Japan. It analyzes the 2019 Okinawan referendum on February 24, 2019, which was the first referendum since 1996 in Okinawa. The issue of 2019 was the reclamation of Henoko Bay to construct a replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station.

The process of the 2019 Okinawan referendum was a process of party politics as well as direct democracy. On September 5, 2018, a citizen group headed by Jin’shiro Motoyama, a graduate school student of Hitotsubashi University, submitted 92,848 signatures to the Government of Okinawa Prefecture. Those were collected from all 41 municipalities. On September 20, the Vice Governor Jahana Ki’ichiro, on behalf of the former Governor Takeshi Onaga who had passed away in August, sent a bill on referendum to the Assembly of Okinawa.

In October 26, the Assembly passed the bill by 26 All-Okinawa members supported it, while 18 members from the LDP and the NKP opposed it, and two JRP members abstained.

However, five municipalities with pro-LDP mayors expressed reluctance to enforce the ordinance after the Assembly of Okinawa passed it. One of the reasons, they said, was that the ballot had only two options: “Agree” and “Disagree.” Responding to this situation, the Assembly of Okinawa passed the amendment bill to add another option “Neither,” while five LDP members opposed it and two LDP members abstained. Finally, the five municipalities with pro-LDP mayors decided to enforce the ordinance.

Table 2-1 shows the change in institutional design of the 2019 Okinawan referendum between the original and the amendment. On the one hand, there were no changes in the legally binding nature, the quorum, and the question wording. The voting result was not legally binding, just imposing the obligation on the governor to respect the voting result. As a quorum, only the minimum share (one-quarter of the effective votes) was institutionalized. The question wording referred not only to the reclamation at Henoko but also to the replacement for the Futenma Air Station. On the other hand, there is an only change in options. The original two options “Agree” and “No” were added by the third option “Neither.”

Study 2 analyzes two types of survey experiments regarding the status quo (SQ), to understand the effect of ballot design as a result of party politics on citizens’ voting behavior. The first experiment will examine the framing effect of the issue. How does the Futenma Air Station as SQ in the question affect citizens’ choices? The second experiment will examine the design effect of the options. How does adding “Neither” as the third option affect citizens’

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24 Article 13 of the ordinance stated that some affairs of the governor, such as preparing the eligible-voters list, were to be handled by the municipality in accordance with Article 252-17-2 of the Local Government Act (Act No. 67 of 1947).
choices? The results of these experiments will indicate how party politics could affect the outcome of direct democracy.

Data Collection

This paper uses data sets produced by the Japan Elites and Equality Study in Japan (JEES, but tentatively, Principle Investigator: Yoshihiko Takenaka, Professor at the University of Tsukuba), the Survey on the Image of Foreign, Countries and Current Topics (SIFCCT, Principle Investigator: Masaru Kohno, Professor at Waseda University), and the 2019 Okinawan Referendum Study (ORS, Principle Investigator: Isamu Okada, Associate Professor at Nagoya University). Non-responses were excluded from the analysis. Using these data sets, all tables and figures in this paper were created by the author.

The data sets are categorized into three groups. The first group is a data set of Japanese elite survey, called as Elites_2018. This is an amalgamation of four surveys conducted by JEES, using the same questionnaires in 2018–2019 (all by mail survey). The first is a survey of business, social, political, and local elites was conducted from October 5, 2018 to January 31, 2019 (1,452 responses, 16.8 percent response rate). The second is a survey of national and local politicians conducted from November 1 to January 24, 2018 (246 responses, 25.3 percent response rate). The third is a survey of national and local politicians conducted from December 13, 2019 to February 10, 2020 (61 responses, 10.4 percent response rate). The fourth is a survey

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25 The JEES and ORS data sets were allowed to use from each Principle Investigators. The SIFCCT data set were allowed to use by the Social Science Japan Data Archive (Survey Number: 0981), the University of Tokyo. The author really appreciate the understanding by Professor Takenaka, Professor Kohno, and Professor Okada.
of business elites conducted in cooperation with the Japan Productivity Center (47 responses; response rate is unknown as it was a commissioned survey).26

The second group is data sets of surveys on Japanese national mass. This group consists of two data sets. The first is an online survey of people sampled people aged 20 years and older across country, which was Wave 20 from May 17 to 24, 2013 (2,135 responses) of SIFCCT. It is called as National_2013. The second is an online survey of people aged 18 years and older (assigned to the distribution of gender and age in the census) across country conducted by JEES from January 13 to 19, 2018 (800 responses). It is called as National_2018.

The third group is data sets of surveys on local residents in Okinawa. ORS conducted two online surveys of almost 1,000 people aged 18 years and older living in Okinawa Prefecture before and after the 2019 Okinawa Prefecture Referendum. Wave 1 was conducted from February 19 to 22, 2019, and Wave 2 was conducted from February 26 to March 1, 2019. The Referendum Day was February 24, 2019. The respondents to Wave 1 were 1,024 people, of which 910 people responded to Wave 2. It should be noted that the method and timing were different from other data. Study 1 uses only Wave 1, called as Local_2019. Study 2 uses both Wave 1 and 2.

Although the timings and methods of each survey are varied as above, the reason for using these datasets is because of having similar questions regarding base politics. In this paper, Study 1 uses data sets of Japanese elite survey, Japanese national mass, and Okinawan local residents, to compare those attitudes toward the disproportion in US base burden each other. Study 2 uses data sets of Okinawan local residents, to analyze the effect of ballot design as a result of party politics on citizens’ voting behavior.

Study 1

How do people in Japan perceive the US bases burden and their regional distribution? How do they justify the regional disproportion in US base burden? To explore these two questions, Study 1 connects base politics scholarship with foreign policy analysis theoretically, and compares attitudes toward the US base burden between the elites of various sectors, the national mass, and the local residents in Okinawa.

Connecting Base Politics with Foreign Policy Analysis

In the scholarship context of foreign policy, the importance of public opinion research has increased over time. Ole R. Holsti reviewed the studies on public opinion and foreign policy mostly in the US, and demonstrated the impacts of three wars on scholarship.27 World War I made scholars pay attention to public opinion and its impact on foreign affairs. After World War II, a broad agreement known as the “Almond-Lippmann consensus”28 was reached. It consists of three propositions regarding public opinion: (1) being volatile, and not providing adequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies, (2) having no coherence or structure, and (3) having little impact on foreign policy. However, the Vietnam War stimulated studies by a


new generation to reexamine the aforementioned propositions. Although they revealed public
opinion on foreign policy is stable and structured,\(^{29}\) how much public opinion actually influences
foreign policy has been discussed.\(^{30}\)

The impact of public opinion on foreign policy, the third proposition above, is associated
with gaps between elites or leaders and publics or mass, which is the focus of Study 1. Using
data sets from seven surveys between 1974 and 2002 by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
(CCFR), Benjamin I. Page and his colleagues showed the persistent gaps of foreign policy
preference between leaders and citizens in the US.\(^{31}\) Using various surveys between 1974 and
2002 including CCFR and the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP), Ole R. Holsti found
that leaders have been more supportive for an active international role for the US than the public
has.\(^{32}\)

On the contrary, Joshua Kertzer proposed three types of gap, including attitudes, traits,
and decision-making, and argued that gaps between elite and public are less than those which
suggested by existing studies had showed. Firstly, using experimental studies on various topics, a
meta-analysis of 162 paired treatments on political elites and mass publics indicated that existing

*American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, no. 4, 1987, pp. 1099–120; Shapiro, Robert Y., and Benjamin I. Page.
“Foreign Policy and the Rational Public.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1988, pp. 211–47; Berinsky,
on Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework.” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93, no. 3,
Cambridge University Press, Sept. 1999, pp. 553–73. As a comparison between US and UK, see Jenkins-Smith,

\(^{30}\) As reviews, see Kaarbo, Juliet. “A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR
and the Electoral Connection.” *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, pp. 477–502; Jacobs,

\(^{31}\) Page, Benjamin I., and Jason Barabas. “Foreign Policy Gaps between Citizens and Leaders.” *International
Disconnect*, University of Chicago Press, 2006. See also Wittkopf, Eugene R. *Faces of Internationalism: Public

\(^{32}\) Holsti, Ole R. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition*. University of Michigan Press,
2004, chap.4.
studies by political scientists overstated the magnitude of elite-public gaps in decision-making. Secondly, using observable survey data on foreign policy, an analysis of 12 waves of elite and mass public opinion over 43 years revealed that the determinants of elite-public gaps are almost not due to elites’ expertise but the differences in demographics.  

Study 1 connects these public opinion studies on foreign policy with base politics scholarship which focuses on individual analysis. The attitudes toward US military in the host countries is strongly associated with the attitudes regarding foreign policy of those countries. However, base politics scholarship using individual analysis disregards the association with attitudes toward foreign policy, while public opinion studies on foreign policy analysis disregards the attitudes toward overseas basing in the host countries. To connect these two streams of scholarship, Study 1 analyzes gaps between elites, national mass, and local residents in terms of attitudes toward US base burden in associated with foreign policy in Japan. It will focus on the way of perceiving regional disproportion in base burden and of justifying regionally concentrated base burden in Okinawa.

Perceiving the Disproportion in US Base Burden

How do people in Japan perceive the US base burden and their regional distribution? Table 1-2 reports the responses regarding problems with and perception of the US bases in the Wave 1 of ORS survey. In terms of problems, 74 percent chose “security,” 52 percent “land use,” 42 percent “sovereignty,” 37 percent “peace,” 30 percent “economy,” 17 percent

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“Identity,” and 11 percent chose “culture.” In total, 95 percent of local respondents in Okinawa said that the US bases had some problems. However, some of the people in Okinawa feel the US base burden is justified. Table 1-2 indicates that almost 35 percent agree with the opinion that the concentration of US base burden on Okinawa is unavoidable.

Elites and national mass also perceive the problems with US bases, that is, the US base burden. Figure 1-1 presents histograms of perceptions regarding issues of inequality in Japan, complied using JEES data. Respondents were asked to rate their perceptions on a 11-point scale, which is rescaled from 0 = “Perfectly Equal” to 1 “Extremely Unequal” on x-axis. Vertical red lines indicate the mean of each topic. Figure A represents Elites_2018, and B represents National_2018. Both elites and national mass perceive that the US base burden in Japan is the most unequal of various topics in Japan.

However, perceiving regional inequality in the US base burden does not indicate that it is the most significant issue. Using JEES and SIFCCT data sets, Figure 1-2 plots the perceived extent of regional disproportion in the US base burden as x, and the extent of attitude to justify US base burden on Okinawa as y. Respondents were asked the extent of justifying on such burden a 5-point scale, which is rescaled from 0 = “Disagree” to 1 = “Agree” on y-axis. Figure A represents Elites_2018, B-1 National_2018, and B-2 National_2013. The size of circles indicates each share of the total.

Figure 1-2 shows that more than a quarter of elites and national mass justify the regionally unequal US base burden on Okinawa. The dark circles are shares of respondents who agreed that the overburden on Okinawa is unavoidable, although they perceived the burden as overburdened. More than 25 percent agreed with that the overburden on Okinawa is unavoidable,
specifically 28.0 percent of 1,228 elites, 26.4 percent of 749 citizens in 2018, and 38.8 percent of 2,115 citizens in 2013, although they perceived the regional disproportion in US base burden.

**Justifying Regional Disproportion in US Base Burden: Theory and Hypothesis**

How do they justify the regional disproportion in US base burden? Study 1 explores its association with three factors: party politics, system justification, and liberal norms.35

The first is the effect of party politics, which has been examined repeatedly in both elite and mass studies. Regarding elites, studies in the US after the Vietnam War revealed that the Congress votes on foreign policy issues were affected by the party affiliation with and the ideological distance from the president.36 Studies in European countries indicated that parliamentary votes on foreign policy issues were affected by partisan ideology across Europe.37 Furthermore, in the studies on regional disparities, Achim Kemmerling and Thilo Bodenstein demonstrated the effect of partisan politics on redistribution across regions in a study on European regional disparities.38

Party politics affect not only elites but also public opinion through party/partisan cues. Adam J. Berinsky surveyed from World War II to the Iraq War, and revealed that public opinion


concerning war were shaped by patterns of elite conflict. Tim Groeling and Matthew A. Baum demonstrated that partisanship affects public opinion formation and conditioned the effects of news information on them regarding national security. As research on regional disparities, Francesc Amat found that left-right partisanship had a significant impact on the formation of individual preferences for inter-regional redistribution in Spain.

However, Alexandra Guisinger and Elizabeth N. Saunders’ experimental study revealed that party cues were conditioned by political polarization. Any messages from them could shift public opinion where political polarization was limited, while only partisan-attributed messages could have an impact where issues were politically polarized.

Study 1 examines the dimension of conservative-liberal or right-liberal of party politics, not that of ruling-opposition parties. Certainly, Japanese government has been governed by the coalition of LDP and NKP since 2013. However, the NKP is more positive in terms of reducing the US base burden on Okinawa than the LDP. Additionally, the JRP as a conservative party takes a similar position to the LDP regarding base burden on Okinawa. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:

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Hypothesis 1A: Those who are supporters or members of conservative parties would be likely to justify the regional disproportion in base burden.

Hypothesis 1B: Those who are supporters or members of non-conservative parties would not be likely to justify the regional disproportion in base burden.

Hypothesis 1C: The effect of perceiving the regional disproportion in base burden on justifying it would be moderate when they are supporters or members of conservative parties.

The second is the effect of system justification, which is defined as “the psychological process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest.” It rationalizes and reinforces the status quo (SQ), and results in conservative ideology. Through a comprehensive meta-analysis, John T. Jost and his colleagues demonstrated that the core of conservatism consisted of resistance to change and justifying inequality and is motivated by needs to manage uncertainty and threat.

Focusing on justifying inequality, system justification implies two different mechanisms within a system. One is in-group favoritism for advantaged groups, and another is out-group favoritism for disadvantaged groups. In an integrated study, it was shown that members of advantaged groups such as whites, the younger, and heterosexuals, had implicit in-group favoritism, while members of disadvantaged groups, such as African Americans, the elderly, and gays/lesbians, had implicit out-group favoritism. In particular, people disadvantaged by SQ

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would have the greatest psychological need to reduce ideological dissonance and would therefore be most likely to justify existing social systems. As a result, system justification promotes conservative attitudes even among the working class, and strengthens national attachment even among liberal people.

Study 1 examines the effect of the US-Japan Security Treaty as the core of SQ for Japanese national security. The association of recognizing the US-Japan alliance as SQ with justifying the regional disproportion in US base burden on Okinawa would be broadly observed. However, justifying it by disadvantaged group, such as local residents in Okinawa who think the bases have a lot of problems, is associated with out-group favoritism. As a result, the association of in-group favoritism with justifying the regional disproportion would be observed just among elites and national mass, not among local residents in Okinawa. We therefore formulate the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 2A:** Those who prefer for SQ of national security would be likely to justify regional disproportion in base burden.

**Hypothesis 2B:** Those who have in-group favoritism would be likely to justify regional disproportion in base burden.


Hypothesis 2C The effect of perceiving regional disproportion in base burden on justifying it would be more moderate when they prefer for SQ of national security, or when they, except for local residents, have in-group favoritism.

The third is the effect of liberal norms, which has been instrumentally assumed in democratic peace theory. As empirical studies, Jo Jakobsen, Tor G. Jakobsen, and Eirin Rande Ekevold conducted multilevel analysis of 72 countries between 1981 and 2008, and empirically demonstrated that citizens of democracies are significantly more pacifist than those of non-democracies.49 This study supports the micro level assumption on democratic peace theory.

However, other recent studies have questioned such assumptions. Through a large-scale survey experiment, Mark S. Bell and Kai Quek found that mass publics in an authoritarian regime had reluctance to use force against democracies as is found in western democracies.50 The results of an experimental study with student participants by Femake E. Bekker also did not support that either regime-type or liberal norms affect the willingness to attack the opponent, and that there are differences in liberal norms between individuals of different regime types.51

Study 1 examines the variation in the effects of liberal norms. Since 2012, the LDP and the NKP have continued to win all nationwide elections, while in almost all Okinawa prefecture-wide elections, candidates who oppose the current realignment plan of the US bases in Japan has been continued to win. It has been argued by liberal people that the realignment plan could not

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sufficiently reduce the US base burden on Okinawa, and that national government should respond to local public opinion. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 3A:** Those who have liberal norms in terms of foreign policy, especially local residents, would not be likely to justify regional disproportion in base burden.

**Hypothesis 3B** The effect of perceiving regional disproportion in base burden on justifying it would be stronger when they would have liberal norms.

**Method of Estimation**

Study 1 conducts OLS regression analyses using *Eliets_2018* and *National_2018* from JEES, *National_2013* from SIFCCT, and *Local_2019* from ORS to explore how elites, national mass, and local residents justify the regional disproportion in US base burden. All variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 in order to interpret easily.

**Dependent Variable**

Study 1 uses the attitude of justifying US bases burden on Okinawa rated as the dependent variable. It is a question which asked the respondents’ attitudes toward one opinion, namely, “the concentration of US base burden on Okinawa is unavoidable, if considering its strategic importance.” It was originally rated using a 5-point or a 7-point scale. Study 1 rescales it from 0 = “Disagree” to 1 = “Agree”, as was shown in Figure 1-2.

**Independent Variables**

Study 1 designates *aBRD*, which is the perception of regional disproportion in US base burden, as the baseline for regression analyses. Questions asking this perception are similar, though not exactly the same. JEES surveyed it using a 11-point scale, which Study 1 rescales
from 0 = “Completely Equal” to 1 ‘Extremely Unequal.’ SIFCCT investigated it on a 3-point scale, which Study 1 rescaled into 0 = “Not Overburdened,” .5 = “Neither,” and 1 = “Overburdened.” Though ORS as a survey on local residents did not examine regional disproportion, Study 1 uses the sum of items that respondents considered as issues with US military, such as security, land use, peace, and economy. Those are rescaled from 0 to 1.

The variables to examine the hypotheses are as follows. Regarding party politics, Study 1 uses two variables. The first is $b_{PCO}$, which is a dummy variable that represents the respondents’ support or membership of conservative parties, such as LDP or JRP. The second is $e_{PPC}$, which is another dummy variable that represents the respondents’ support or membership of other parties than LDP or JRP. All the data sets surveyed party support, except for politicians who were categorized depending on the sampling list.

In terms of system justification, Study 1 uses two variables. The first is $c_{USJ}$, which pertains to attitude toward the US-Japan Alliance. However, the surveys presented different questions regarding this aspect. Specifically, JEES focused on the reinforcement of the alliance and used a 5-point scale, which Study 1 rescales from 0 = “Disagree” to 1 = “Agree.” Further, SIFCCT presented an indirect question, which asked attitude toward the concentration of US base burden in Okinawa: “the US forces in Japan should be downsized by promoting their relocation out of the country.” The original scale was a 5-point one, which Study 1 reversed and rescaled from 0 = “Agree” to 1 = “Disagree.” Lastly, ORS focused on maintaining the alliance and used a 7-point scale, which is rescaled from 0 = “Disagree” to 1 = “Agree.”

Another variable for system justification is $d_{ING}$, which represents in-group favoritism. JEES and SIFCCT had a question associated with in-group favoritism for Japanese people. Those surveys used different scales to investigate attitudes toward the right to vote in local
politics of foreigners with permanent residency in Japan. JEES used a 4-point scale added with ‘No attitude,’ and SIFCCT used a 5-point scale. Both are rescaled from 0 = “Agree” to 1 = “Disagree” in Study 1. In contrast, ORS did not explore foreign suffrage. Instead, Study 1 uses a variable associated with in-group favoritism for Okinawa. That is the total number of items that respondents considered problems with US forces in Okinawa, such as sovereignty, identity, and culture. The total number is rescaled from 0 to 1.

Regarding liberal norms, Study 1 uses fDEM, which represents normative attitude toward the response of foreign policy to public opinion. JEES used a 7-point scale added with ‘No attitude,’ whereas SIFCCT used an 11-point scale. Both are rescaled from 0 = “Foreign policy does not have to respond to public opinion.” to 1 = “Foreign policy should respond to public opinion.” ORS focused on the perception whether “Foreign policy should respond to public opinion” using a 7-point scale, which Study 1 rescaled from 0 = “Definitely Disagree” to 1 = “Definitely Agree.”

Control Variables

Seven variables are used as control. gMEN is a dummy variable used when the respondent is male. hAGE denotes raw age. iEDU is a dummy variable for academic achievement (i.e., respondents graduated with bachelor’s or master’s degrees). jCEN represents the national elite status of a respondent in the case of National_2018 or if a respondent was living in Tokyo in the case of National_2013 and National_2018. Local_2019 lacked this variable. kPOL is a dummy variable indicating that a respondent is a politician surveyed in Elites_2018. IBRC is a dummy variable representing that a respondent is a bureaucrat surveyed in Elites_2018. mBAS is a dummy variable when the respondent is a stakeholder of the US military.
Models

Study 1 conducts a statistical estimation of two models by OLS. The first model uses all samples to estimate all variables, whereas the second model uses only partisan-independent samples to estimate except for partisan variables such as $bPCO$ and $ePPC$, respectively. Four data sets, namely, *Elites_2018*, *National_2013*, *National_2018*, and *Local_2019*, were used to estimate each model. A total of eight models are estimated. These models use interaction terms to examine the mitigating effect of perceptions on regional disproportion in US base burden, as *Hypothesis 1C*, *2C*, and *3B*. The interaction terms are $aBRD: bPCO$ and $aBRD: ePPC$ for all sample, and $aBRD: cUSJ$, $aBRD: dING$, and $aBRD: fDEM$ for the partisan-independent sample.

Results

Figure 1-3 reports standardized regression coefficients of independent variables with 95 percent confidence intervals as horizontal bars. Figure 1-4 simulates the marginal effects of some interaction terms. Detailed results are summarized as Table A2, A3, and A4, and the coefficients of control variables are shown as Table A5 in APPENDIX.

$aBRD$ as the baseline affect the extent of justifying regional disproportion in base burden, especially among elites. The more people perceive the regional disproportion in US base burden, the more they do not justify it.

Party politics: $bPCO$ affect the extent of justifying regional disproportion in base burden, especially among elites and local residents. People who is a supporter or a member of conservative parties, such as LDP or JRP, are likely to justify the regional disproportion. In contrary, $ePPC$ has less effect than $bPCO$, although the effect of $ePPC$ among local residents are greater than others. As interaction terms, $aBRD: bPCO$ has positive effects except among local
residents, while $aBRD: ePPC$ has less effect than $aBRD: bPCO$. The marginal effects of $aBRD: bPCO$ are shown in the upper row of Figure 1-4. The slope of the curve is more moderate when the respondent is a supporter or a member of conservative parties ($bPCO=1$). These results indicates that Hypotheses 1A is strongly supported, and Hypotheses 1B and 1C are just partly supported.

System justification: $cUSJ$ have the most constant effect on justifying regional disproportion in base burden. Among both all samples and partisan-independent samples, the coefficients indicates more than 0.1. The more people prefer for the US-Japan Alliance as SQ, the more they justify regional disproportion in the US base burden. $dING$ has moderate effect on the justification, except for local residents. The more people, except for local residents, have in-group favoritism, the more they justify the regional disproportion in US base burden. The interaction terms have no effects, except for $aBRD: cUSJ$ among partisan-independent samples in National_2013. Its marginal effect is shown in the bottom row of Figure 1-4. The more people prefer for the US-Japan Alliance as SQ, the more moderate slope of curve is ($cUSJ=1$). These results strongly support Hypotheses 2A and 2B, and Hypotheses 2C is just partly supported.

Liberal norms: $fDEM$ has some effects on justifying regional disproportion, especially among local residents. The more local residents have liberal norms, the more they do not justify it. The interaction terms has no effects, except for $aBRD: fDEM$ among partisan-independent samples in National_2013. Its marginal effect is shown in the bottom row of Figure 1-4. The more people have liberal norms, the steeper slope of curve is ($fDEM=1$). These results partly support Hypotheses 3A and 3B.
Study 2

While Study 1 focused people’s justification of regionally disproportionate US base burden, Study 2 explores the effect of party politics on citizens’ voting behavior regarding US base issues. As reviewed above, the existing studies of base politics have not considered the impact of elites on mass attitudes toward the US bases in host countries. In contrast to them, Study 2 focuses on the effect of ballot design as a result of party politics on citizens’ voting behavior.

Party Politics, Ballot Design, and Citizens’ Voting Behavior

In the scholarship context of direct democracy, party politics is a critical factor that affects citizens’ behavior. One direct effect of party politics is the party or partisan cue. Walter Borges and Harold D. Clarke found that party cues as well as leader cues have conditional effects on voters’ choices by analyzing a cue experiment conducted during the 2006 midterm elections in the US. Sarah Binze Hobolt revealed that voting intention for EU supporting parties increases the rate of support for the EU in a referendum using cross-national data from 18 referendums on EU integration. Jack Vowles showed that citizens’ party support forms their policy preferences, which in turn determine actual voting behavior, by analyzing a panel survey during the 2011 electoral referendum in the United Kingdom.53

52 The earlier version of this part were presented at the 2019 Annual Conference of Japanese Association of Electoral Studies as a paper co-othered with Isamu Okada, and Itaru Yanagi, and the winner of Best Presentation Award.
In the 2019 Okinawan Referendum as well as the above cases, the effect of party cues has already been examined. Yoshiaki Kubo et al. conducted a multi-nominal logit analysis of voting behavior in this referendum using an online survey data. To sum up their findings regarding party cue, firstly, voters who supported the “All-Okinawa” party coalition tended to vote for “Disagree.” Secondly, voters who supported LDP tended to vote for “Agree” or abstain. Thirdly, voters who were faced with an inconsistency between anti-US base policy attitude and party support for LDP were forced to choose either “Agree” or “Disagree.”

This paper focuses on another indirect effect of party politics, that said, ballot design effects. In general, citizens’ political preferences are formed through interactions with their environment. Existing studies on direct democracy have explored the effects of ballot design as one of the factors that shapes citizens’ environments. For example, quorum, such as minimum turnout or minimum vote share, affect citizens’ decision-making regarding whether to participate in the vote. Particularly for referendums compared to initiatives, politicians are more involved in the ballot design process. Thus, party politicians have an indirect influence on citizens’ preference formation through the ballot design process.

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Theory and Hypothesis

To shed a light on the ballot design effects in the 2019 Okinawan referendum, this study theorizes effects of the information on SQ that is provided on the ballot. We identified three reasons for this. Firstly, the effect of information in referendums is larger than that of elections because voters’ preferences are more likely to change in the short term. Secondly, preference formation and voting are considered endogenous under specific designs in a referendum for a change from SQ. For example, under the minimum turnout rule, citizens who would not like to change SQ are likely to abstain as a matter of strategy. Such citizens do not form a preference in polling stations but rather decide whether to vote after forming their preferences. Thirdly, citizens have SQ bias, which is a tendency to avoid change in uncertain situations. In the context of referendums, SQ bias makes citizens choose options that result in maintaining SQ or abstain from voting.

In the case of 2019 Okinawan referendum, the ballot provided voters with information on SQ through its question and options. SQ was the situation that the construction work at Henoko had been continued since 2018.

Firstly, a question referred to the replacement of the Futenma Air Station in addition to the reclamation at Henoko. Before starting the construction, Henoko is a word to frame SQ as positive, for it gives voters a remind that the reclamation at Henoko would destroy the marine environment and its biodiverse ecosystem. Meanwhile, Futenma is a word to frame SQ as

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negative, for it gives voters a remind that the reclamation would be for removing “the Futenma Air Station said to be the most dangerous base in the world.” As such, if the ballot refers to the replacement facility for Futenma, then disagreement with the reclamation at Henoko will be mitigated.

However, considering the ongoing construction as SQ, the framing is reversed. Henoko is a word to frame SQ as negative, for it gives voters a remind that the ongoing reclamation would destroy the marine environment and its biodiverse ecosystem at Henoko. Futenma is a word to frame SQ as positive, for it gives voters a remind that the reclamation would be for removing the Futenma Air Station.

**Hypothesis 1** If the questionnaire refers to a phrase that frames SQ as negative, then the share of the options that describe SQ as positive would increase. If the questionnaire refers to a phrase that frames SQ as positive, then the share of the options that describe SQ as negative would increase. In the 2019 Okinawan referendum, if the ballot refers to “the replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station,” which is a phrase that frames SQ as positive, then the share of “Disagree” will be smaller than if it does not.

Secondly, the original ordinance's two options, “Agree” or “Disagree”, were amended to include “Neither.” Figure 2-1A puts “Neither” at a neutral position between “Agree” and

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59 Quotes from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s answer to a question regarding the 2019 Okinawan Referendum from Kenji Eda (CDP, 8th district of Kanagawa). Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, 198th Diet, February 20, 2019. Originally in Japanese, translated by the author.

“Disagree.” The hypothesis derived from this figure is that the shares of both “Agree” and “Disagree” will decrease when a third option is added, compared with the case where only two options are given.

However, if SQ is considered as a benchmark for citizens, then neutrally worded options (e.g., “Neither”) can be assumed as not a neutral option but an option of not changing—that is, maintaining SQ. In actual voting situations, neutrally worded options would stimulate the SQ bias of voters, thereby reducing the voting share of options that would change SQ. Figure 2-1B shows the case of the 2019 Okinawan referendum. The ongoing construction work at Henoko that began in 2018 represented SQ. Thus, “Agree” and “Neither” can be seen as interchangeable options for maintaining the SQ of continuing the construction. The hypothesis derived from here is that only the share of “Disagree” will decrease when three options are given, compared with the case where citizens choose between only “Agree” or “Disagree.”

Hypothesis 2A If one of the options is neutrally worded, then the shares of both options for changing or maintaining SQ would decrease. In the 2019 Okinawan referendum, if the options will include “Neither” as the third one, then the shares of both “Agree” and “Disagree” will decrease, compared with the case if it does not.

Hypothesis 2B However, in the actual voting situation, if one of the options is neutrally worded, only the share of the option for changing SQ would decrease. In the 2019 Okinawan referendum, if the third option of “Neither” is included, then only the share of “Disagree” will decrease, compared with the case if it does not.
Considering SQ as a benchmark for citizens also derives a hypothesis regarding abstention. As shown in referendum studies, abstention, in the context of the minimum turnout rule with legally binding power, is not a neutral choice but rather a strategic one for citizens who prefer SQ. Additionally, even in a consultive referendum without legally binding power, citizens who prefer to SQ tend to abstain. In the case of the 2019 Okinawan referendum, as shown in Figure 2-1B, abstention can be seen as interchangeable with “Agree” and “Neither” as choices for maintaining SQ. The hypothesis derived from here is that the shares of “Agree” and “Neither” in the actual voting situation will decrease, compared with the hypothetical situation. This gap could be described as a hypothetical bias.

**Hypothesis 3** In the actual voting situation, the shares of options for maintaining SQ would decrease, compared with the hypothetical situation. In the 2019 Okinawan referendum, the shares of “Agree” and “Neither” in the actual voting will be smaller than those in the hypothetical experiment.

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Experimental Design

To test these hypotheses, study 2 conduct two types of survey experiment. The first is a framing experiment of SQ in question to examine Hypothesis 1, and the second is a choice experiment of options to examine Hypothesis 2A, 2B, and 3. These experiments were conducted in both of wave 1 and wave 2 of the ORS.

In the first framing experiment, the respondents were randomly assigned two groups. While control group read a questionnaire referring only Henoko as negative frame of SQ, intervening group read a questionnaire referring not only Henoko but also Futenma as positive frame of SQ. In the second choice experiment, the respondents were randomly assigned to two groups as well as framing experiment. While control group were given only two options of “Agree” and “Disagree”, intervening group were given three options of “Agree,” “Disagree,” and “Neither.” In sum, the respondent were randomly assigned to four groups as Table 2-2 shows.

Results

Figure 2-2 shows shares of each response, analyzing all participants data. Red colored Figure 2-2A is of Wave 1 before the referendum, and blue colored Figure 2-2B is of Wave 2 after the referendum. Each error bar shows 95 percent confidence interval. Descriptions below figures are the results of chi squared test.

Firstly, regarding the effects of question, Figure 2-2A shows no difference between Group A and B, and Group C and D in Wave 1. Figure 2-2B is not as obvious as Figure 2-2A, but “the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station” has no effect on responses. Secondly, regarding the effects of options, Figure 2-2A shows certain differences between Group A and C,
and Group B and D in Wave 1. Shares of ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ in Group C and D are almost 10 to 15 percentage points less than Group A and B. Adding ‘Neither’ to options has certain effects on citizens’ preference formation. However, in Figure 2-2B does not show a clear result as Figure 2-2A. In sum, these findings do not support for Hypothesis 1, but support for Hypothesis 2A partially. The chi square tests for four groups and two groups in options are statistically significant, but not significant for two groups in question.

Figure 2-3 shows shares of each response, analyzing the data of respondents who are active in voting. Figure 2-3A is the results of participants who said ‘I will definitely vote’ in Wave 1. Figure 2-3B and 2-3C is the results of participants who responded ‘I voted’ in Wave 2.

Firstly, all in Figure 2-3 shows no difference between Group A and B, and Group C and D. There are subtle decreasing or increasing of ‘Agree,’ ‘Disagree,’ or ‘Neither,’ but they are not consistent. ‘The replacement facility for Futenma Air Station’ has no effect as same as Figure 2-2. Secondly, Figure 2-2A shows asymmetry effects of ‘Neither’ on the shares of other options. Comparing Group C and D to A and B, the shares of ‘Disagree’ in Group C and D are almost 5 to 20 percentage points less than those of Group A and D. In contrast, there is no decreasing in ‘Agree.’ This finding do support for Hypothesis 2B. The chi square tests for four groups and two groups in options are statistically significant, but not significant for two groups in question.

Figure 2-4 compares the results of hypothetical experiments with actual voting in the 2019 Okinawan Referendum. Orange painted bar represents Experiment in Wave 1, blue painted bar represents Experiment in Wave 2, and white painted bar represents responses to recall question about voting behavior in the referendum.
Comparing hypothetical experiments to actual voting, the shares of ‘Agree’ in experiments are almost 10 to 15 percentage points less than those in actual voting (recall question). This finding do support for Hypothesis 3.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the attitudes regarding US military bases as the micro-foundations of base politics in Japan. Study 1 focused on regional disparity, Study 2 focused on direct democracy. The findings by two empirical studies are summarized as follows.

Study 1 analyzed the attitudes toward the disproportion in US base burden, comparing between the elites, the national mass, and the local residents in Okinawa. It revealed not only conservative partisanship, but also non-partisan supports for the US-Japan Alliance as the status quo justifies the inter-regional disproportion in US bases in Japan. The effects of perceiving the disproportion and having liberal values about foreign policy on the attitudes were less than the effects of supporting the US-Japan Alliance.

Study 2 analyzed the effects of party politics on citizens’ preference formation in the 2019 Okinawan Referendum. It clarified that party politics in Okinawa affects the preference for US bases through utilizing the status quo. Party politics has significant impact on base politics not just through public policy making, but also through designing the environment that effects citizens’ policy preference formation.

These findings from micro-level analysis have two implications for base politics. Firstly, the support for foreign military bases in host countries depends what people consider to be the status quo. In the case of US bases in Japan, the support for regionally disproportionate bases is highly stable, because people in Japan tend to consider the US-Japan Alliance as the status quo.
In other words, elites for the Alliance can easily justify the disproportion by emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan Alliance as the status quo.

Secondly, as a result of the first point, local protest against foreign military bases in host countries is very difficult to accomplish as far as people take for granted the presence of military bases. In the case of Okinawa, the reason why their protest has been difficult is not the unconsciousness of the disproportion in military base burden, but for the justification of it by the partisan or non-partisan support for the US-Japan Alliance as the status quo in Japan.
TABLES

Table 1-1. Changes in Area and Number of the US Military Facilities in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area [km$^2$]</th>
<th>Number of Facilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Others in Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1972</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1-2. Problems with and Perception of the US Bases: In Okinawa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems with the US military bases in Okinawa</th>
<th>“It is unavoidable that the US base burden concentrates on Okinawa”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definitely Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>.23 .15 .14 .17 .18 .08 .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.29 .16 .14 .14 .15 .07 .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use</td>
<td>.32 .18 .11 .14 .13 .07 .04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>.33 .17 .15 .15 .14 .03 .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>.28 .18 .16 .15 .15 .05 .04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>.39 .15 .11 .17 .10 .06 .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>.33 .15 .09 .13 .18 .05 .08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>.21 .14 .13 .18 .18 .10 .07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.21 .14 .13 .18 .18 .10 .07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-1. Ballot Design of the 2019 Okinawan Referendum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 2018</th>
<th>February 2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legally binding power</td>
<td>No, but the Governor must respect the result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quorum Minimum turnout</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quorum Minimum share</td>
<td>One-quarter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Reclamation for constructing a US base planned by the government in Henoko, Nago City, as a replacement facility for Futenma Air Station</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Options</td>
<td>Agree Disagree</td>
<td>Agree Disagree Neither</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2-2. Combinations of Question and Options for Random Assignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A as base line: Henoko</td>
<td>Do you agree or disagree with the reclamation for constructing the US military base in Henoko?</td>
<td>Agree Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; 2 options</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Henoko+Futenma &amp; 2 options</td>
<td>Do you agree or disagree with the reclamation for constructing the US military base in Henoko, which is planned by the Japanese government as a replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station?</td>
<td>Agree Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Henoko &amp; 3 options</td>
<td>Do you agree or disagree with the reclamation for constructing the US military base in Henoko?</td>
<td>Agree Disagree Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Henoko+Futenma &amp; 3 options</td>
<td>Do you agree or disagree with the reclamation for constructing the US military base in Henoko, which is planned by the Japanese government as a replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station?</td>
<td>Agree Disagree Neither</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Perceptions of Inequalities in Japan

A. Elites_2018 (JEES)
Figure 1-1. Perceptions of Inequalities in Japan (continued)

B. Citizens_2018 (JEES)
Figure 1-2. Perceptions of Inequality and Attitudes toward the US Bases

A. Elites_2018 (JEES)

B-1. National_2018 (JEES)

B-2. National_2013 (SIFCCT)
Figure 1-3. Estimated Results of the Regression Analysis: Independent Variables

All Samples

Partisan-Independent Samples
Figure 1-4. Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms

Elites_2018

National_2018

National_2013

National_2013
Figure 2-1. Categorizing Preference Formation and Voting Behavior

A. Exogenous model

Referendum

- Participate
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Neither
- Not participate

B. Endogenous model

SQ: Progress of reclamation at Henoko

- Do not prefer to change
  - Agree
  - Neither
  - No vote: Abstain
- Prefer to change
  - Disagree
Figure 2-2. Experimental Results: All Participants

A. Experiment in Wave 1

Four groups in question and options: $X^2 = 153.07$, df = 6, p-value $< 2.2e-16$
Two groups in question: $X^2 = 1.1111$, df = 2, p-value = 0.5738
Two groups in options: $X^2 = 149.44$, df = 2, p-value $< 2.2e-16$

B. Experiment in Wave 2

Four groups in question and options: $X^2 = 107.94$, df = 6, p-value $< 2.2e-16$
Two groups in question: $X^2 = 4.2918$, df = 2, p-value = 0.117
Two groups in options: $X^2 = 102.39$, df = 2, p-value $< 2.2e-16$
Figure 2-3. Experimental Results: Respondents Active in Voting

A. Experiment in Wave 1, and participants who said ‘I will definitely vote’

![Bar chart for 'I will definitely vote' in Wave 1.]

Four groups in question and options: $X^2 = 27.936$, df = 6, p-value = 9.661e-05
Two groups in question: $X^2 = 0.028782$, df = 2, p-value = 0.9857
Two groups in options: $X^2 = 27.308$, df = 2, p-value = 1.175e-06

B. Experiment in Wave 1, and participants who responded ‘I voted’ to Wave 2

![Bar chart for 'I voted' in Wave 1.]

Four groups in question and options: $X^2 = 63.755$, df = 6, p-value = 7.744e-12
Two groups in question: $X^2 = 0.99035$, df = 2, p-value = 0.6095
Two groups in options: $X^2 = 60.82$, df = 2, p-value = 6.21e-14
Figure 2-3. Experimental Results: Respondents Active in Voting (continued)

C. Experiment and Wave 2, and participants who responded ‘I voted’

Four groups in question and options: X-squared = 43.557, df = 6, p-value = 9.05e-08
Two groups in question: X-squared = 2.8295, df = 2, p-value = 0.243
Two groups in options: X-squared = 38.654, df = 2, p-value = 4.041e-09
Figure 2-4. Comparing Hypothetical Experiment with Actual Voting

X-squared = 238.9, df = 6, p-value < 2.2e-16
BIBLIOGRAPHY


**APPENDIX**

**Table A1. Respondents to Elite Survey (will be translated later)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Survey on All</th>
<th></th>
<th>Survey on Prefectural Assembly</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Response</td>
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Table A2. Correlations between Main Variables of Attitudes: Only Partisan Independents

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<th>USJ</th>
<th>ING</th>
<th>DEM</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.62***</td>
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<td>-.15***</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
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<td>Local Mass in 2018 (812)</td>
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<td>DEM</td>
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<td>.32</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
<td>.29</td>
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Polychoric $\rho$ by Maximum-Likelihood Estimates

***$p<0.001$; **$p<0.01$; *$p<0.05$.

JUS: Justify the US base burden on Okinawa
BRD: Perceive of the US base overburden on Okinawa
USJ: Positive for the US Japan alliance
ING: Positive for participation in local government of permanent foreign residents
DEM: Agree that foreign policy should respond to public opinion
Table A3. OLS Regression Analysis on Study 1: All Sample

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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>-0.07 ***</td>
<td>-0.07 ***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>bPCO</td>
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<td>0.05 ***</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td>0.16 ***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>cUSJ</td>
<td>0.13 ***</td>
<td>0.13 ***</td>
<td>0.14 ***</td>
<td>0.12 ***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.03 ***</td>
<td>0.03 ***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fDEM</td>
<td>-0.02 **</td>
<td>-0.01 *</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.05 ***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gMEN</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04 *</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03 **</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kPOL</td>
<td>-0.06 *</td>
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<td>0.03 *</td>
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N                  1135  2096  749  812
R2                 0.61  0.35  0.45  0.47

All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
### Table A4. OLS Regression Analysis on Study 1: Partisan Independents

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<tr>
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<td>0.12 ***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Figure A5. Estimated Results of the Regression Analysis: Control Variables

All Samples

Partisan-Independent Samples