Source of Costs or Synergy? Democratic Alliance and Use of Force

Kwang-Jin Kim
Fellow of Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
kkim@wcfia.harvard.edu

Abstract

According to the rationality approach to war, a country should terminate waging a war when the costs associated with war exceed a country’s ability to absorb these costs. Using this logic, this study seeks to explain how regime types induce pattern of using forces in the context of alliance. The relationship between democratic countries’ ability to absorb costs and domestic conditions determine transaction costs between democratic allies in wartime. The different domestic conditions of democratic countries entail a gap of sensitivities to combat casualties between democratic allies and then deteriorate wartime collaboration of democratic alliance. Therefore, democratic alliance has pattern to use forces in order to minimize transaction costs and to maintain wartime intra-alliance consensus. I argue that matured democratic alliance tends to choose risk-averse military options that all member countries can accept. In the case of Kosovo War in 1999, one of matured democratic alliance, NATO, had selected sole air campaign in order to minimize combat casualties necessary for member countries’ intra-alliance consensus.
In the field of International Relations, a group of literature focusing on interstate conflicts has emphasized the connection between domestic regime types and foreign policy behaviors. Along this line, some studies have examined how democratic institutional characteristics affect international conflicts. Exploring war and conflict onset, the democratic peace research program has developed compelling mechanisms of why democracies rarely fight each other (Russett 1993; Maoz 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001; Huth and Allee 2002). Beyond the onset of conflicts, recent research has examined a variety of democratic institutional effects on several areas such as escalation and termination of war and conflicts. Moreover, some scholars consider democracy as a determinant of military victory and have developed the logic of how democracies can win war and conflicts (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998; 2002; Reed and Clark 2000; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001). Among those efforts, democratic alliance is captured as a source to increase democracies’ probability of victory, because democracies enjoy relative reliability of alliance compared to non-democracies during wartime (Reiter and Stam 2002; Lipson 2003; Choi 2003). In this argument, the positive relationship between democracy and victory of war is based on the premise that democratic allies can make strong consensus. Yet most studies of regime effects on war outcomes do not pay attention to how democratic alliance generates their own wartime intra-alliance consensus.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationship between characteristics of regime type and alliance’s collective military actions in wartime. To do so, I explicate the rationality approach to war as a logic to explain the decision to terminate interstate conflicts. Although major war studies emphasize the causes rather than outcomes, the rationality
approach can provide useful mechanisms to explain how war ends (Reiter 2003; Maoz and Siverson 2008). In this approach, the decision to terminate war is countries’ rational choices so war outcome is a function of cost-benefit calculus in rational belligerent countries. With this logic, when a country’s accumulated costs exceed its own ability to absorb costs during a militarized dispute, the country stops waging a dispute and accepts unfavorable dispute outcome (Stam 1996; Slantchev 2003; Reiter 2009). Accordingly, changes in amount of costs associated with war become an important determinant of war outcome.

In this circumstance, the relationship between democratic countries’ ability to absorb costs and domestic conditions determine transaction costs between democratic allies. Therefore, democratic alliance has pattern of using forces in order to minimize transaction costs. Here, I argue that democratic alliance tends to choose risk-averse military option for wartime intra-alliance consensus. Existing findings focusing on democratic synergy suggests that a democracy can make better cooperation with other democracies when conducting war, so that a democracy is more likely to win war compared to non-democracies (Choi 2004; 2012). However, if a democratic ally’s preference, intention, and assessment are different from other democratic allies, democratic synergy could be deteriorated.

As an example of domestic conditions, different military structure between democratic countries can determine political elites’ sensitivity to combat casualty and thereby inducing different preference, intention, and assessment. Vasquez III (2005) reported that democracies with conscript manpower system are more likely to be sensitive to the number of casualties than democracies with volunteer manpower system. According
to this finding, democracies with a certain type of military structure are more reluctant to suffer the number of casualties compared to other type of military structure. In this logic, democratic alliance needs to minimize combat casualties in order to preserve wartime intra-alliance consensus. This incentive induces democratic alliance’s pattern to choose risk-averse military option with low level of casualties. In doing so, democratic alliance can decrease transaction costs between partners so that democracies can reduce total costs and increase probability of victory in a militarized dispute.

This study seeks to explain how regime types induce pattern of using force in the context of alliance. In the first section, I review line of literature of the rationality approach to war and explore the logic of how a militarized dispute is terminated. Then, I illustrate how democratic institutional characteristics are connected with the logic of war termination and explain democratic alliance’s pattern of using force. In the next section, I construct empirical model to test single cut causal effect of different military structure of democracies on the probability of victory in a militarized dispute. This single cut test is designed to show the relationship between different domestic conditions in democratic alliance and belligerents’ total costs determining war outcome. Then, I review Kosovo War in 1999 as the case study regarding democracies’ wartime intra-alliance interactions. In this case, I evaluate domestic conditions in each of main NATO member countries and then delineate matured democratic alliance’s pattern to choose risk-averse military option.

**War Termination Logic and Democratic Alliance**

The rationality approach to war and conflict begins with assumptions: (1) war is a
costly way to influence the expectation of the opponent, and (2) belligerents’ expectations are updated through both battle outcomes and diplomatic behaviors. In this approach, belligerent countries’ expectations and updated information can be translated into each country’s cost calculus during a militarized dispute. Therefore, the amount of costs in a belligerent becomes a significant factor to explain how countries terminate militarized disputes.

In this logic, the decision to terminate war and conflict is intrinsically related to belligerents’ uncertainty. In the real world, countries do not share private information about each country’s relative power and willingness to fight. In other words, countries disagree with distribution of power between countries until the related information is exposed to each other through battles (Fearon 1995; Filson and Werner 2002; 2007). In this incomplete information condition, fighting is a way to exchange information about which belligerent is stronger. Therefore, a militarized dispute reveals private information about belligerents’ relative power and willingness so that the exchange of information by battle and wartime diplomacy induces the convergence of expectations regarding military outcomes. As a result, countries share similar expectation about distribution of power and resolve and then they can decide to terminate the militarized dispute.

Nonetheless, countries can logically continue fighting after revealing private information. Because there is no world authority to secure promises between countries, this anarchical characteristic imposes commitment problem that countries cannot trust each other (Powell 2006; Reiter 2009). Accordingly, even after private information is revealed, countries can continue fighting in order to achieve favorable settlement. In other words,
countries decide to continue fighting in order to avoid worse settlement. In this context, the war and conflicts between countries can be continued unless costs associated with disputes exceed countries’ ability to absorb costs. Accordingly, the accumulated costs of dispute is a key factor that affects decisions to terminate a militarized dispute. If a disputant’s ability to bear costs is smaller than total costs associated with a dispute, this country should decide to choose unfavorable settlement rather than continuous fighting. Therefore, accumulated costs in each country are related outcome of a militarized dispute.

Under the assumption of rationality approach to war that war is costly instrument, total costs consist of two types: (1) costs associated with the ability to bear and (2) costs associated with the ability to impose costs (Slantchev 2003). Belligerent countries continue attempting to impose costs simultaneously since the initiation of militarized dispute. The attrition in battlefield, continuous economic sanctions by blockade, strategic bombing on enemy population are typical ways to impose costs on enemy in a militarized dispute (Stam 1996). In addition to the first type of cost imposed by the opponent, a country encounters the second type of cost when imposing costs on the opponent. For example, when a country continues war without international legitimacy and with many casualties, this country could face domestic anti-war protest and serious criticism from international community. These dissents from both domestic and international sources become explicit costs when imposing costs on opponent country.

During a war, continuous increased total costs associated war influence belligerents’ cost calculus. Then, a belligerent country can accept unfavorable settlement in order to avoid continuous costs before the exhaustion of war-fighting capability. Therefore, change
of total cost size is connected with war outcome and countries would terminate a war and conflict under the anarchical characteristics of world. In this logic, increased costs of belligerents can be negatively associated with their own probability of victory in a war as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. War Termination Logic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Costs in a Country</th>
<th>Change of Total Costs</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type #1 cost</td>
<td>Increases of Total Costs</td>
<td>Acceptance of unfavorable settlement instead of continuous of fighting</td>
<td>Decrease of Probability of Winning War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type #2 cost</td>
<td>Constancy of Total Costs</td>
<td>Continuous fighting rather than acceptance of unfavorable settlement</td>
<td>Increase of Probability of Winning War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Figure 1 shows logical connection between costs associated war and war outcome. During a war, countries have faced two choices between acceptance of unfavorable settlement and continuous fighting. If a belligerent accepts its own unfavorable settlement instead of fighting earlier than the opponent, this country loses a war. This logic explains how countries terminate war through its own cost calculus. Also this implies that a country’s ability to absorb costs associated war is a determinant of war outcome. Existing research shows that democratic regime is more sensitive to costs associated war than non-democracies (Bennett and Stam 1998; Filson and Werner 2007). Therefore, characteristics of democratic regime type can be embedded in war termination logic.

In democracies, public concerns can be translated into an institutional constraint on foreign policy choice unlike non-democracies, so the regime type can affect international conflict behaviors. Under the democratic election system, it is assumed that political elites
want to remain in office in next election and opposition parties are always ready to criticize on unpopular policies in order to remove incumbent elites (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999; Huth and Allee 2002). Accordingly, democratic countries’ voting public can replace incumbent leaders who bring unacceptable burden to citizens in the next election. This accountability of a democratic regime generates high domestic costs for foreign policies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). If democratic leaders fail in crisis, then they could meet serious consequences with the voting public. Due to this institutional characteristic, democracies suffer sanctions from the public and domestic audience costs when deciding foreign policy during a militarized dispute.

Bringing these democratic institutional characteristics to the relationship between democracies and war outcome, democratic alliance is more likely to win a war than non-democratic alignment due to effective wartime collaboration between democratic allies. Because domestic audiences can monitor and evaluate political elites’ decisions in a democratic country, democracies can expect transparent behaviors from other democracies during a militarized dispute (Reiter and Stam 1998). This transparent polities enable democracies to have stable preference so that a democracy can make reliable cooperation with other democracies in wartime (Smith 1996; Choi 2004). In addition, one of democratic institutional characteristics is large number of veto players in political system, so it is relatively difficult for democracies to change their own main policies due to checks of veto players. Therefore, there is low possibility that a democracy can abandon existing commitment with other democracies (Choi 2012). As a result, democracies can make
reliable and stable collaboration with democratic partners, so called democratic synergy, and then increase the probability of victory in a war.

Under this democratic synergy focusing on close ties between democratic allies, democracies are assumed to share assessment of situation, intentions, and preferences during wartime, because of their own similar institutions (Choi 2004; 2012). At the same logic, if each democratic ally’s assessment, intention, and preference are different from each others, there exist transaction costs between allies when democratic alliance attempts to solve these differences. Because transaction costs within democratic alliance become additional total costs in a war, this tendency can be negatively connected with war outcome in war termination logic. Under this logic, this increased transaction costs can determine outcome of war as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. War termination logic of democratic alliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs in a Democratic Alliance</th>
<th>Change of Total Costs</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of transaction cost within allies</td>
<td>Increase of Total Costs</td>
<td>Acceptance of unfavorable settlement instead of continuous of fighting</td>
<td>Decrease of Probability of Winning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constancy of Total Costs</td>
<td>Continuous fighting rather than acceptance of unfavorable settlement</td>
<td>Increase of Probability of Winning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Figure 2 is an offshoot of war termination logic as shown in Figure 1 and emphasizes how alliance’s collective costs influence amount of total costs during a war. In this logic, the sources of transaction costs between democratic allies can affect war outcome. Generally different assessment, intention, and preference between allies induces
the disagreement about objective, strategy, and conduct of war within alliance and then becomes transactions costs in wartime. With democratic institutional characteristics, differences among domestic condition of democratic allies mainly affect countries wartime assessment, intention, and preference. Taken this statement in war termination logic, different domestic conditions within democratic alliance weaken democratic synergy thereby increasing transaction costs and then drops the probability of victory in a war.

**Sensitivities to Casualties and Matured Democratic Alliance**

Democratic countries’ domestic conditions can be a source of transaction cost in democratic alliance through democratic leaders’ sensitivity to combat casualties. Generally democratic leaders are more likely to be sensitive to combat casualties in a war rather than non-democratic leaders. In democracies, combat casualties from military actions deteriorate public support thereby threatening political leaders’ position in next election, so democratic leaders tend to avoid wars with high casualties (Muller 1973; Bennet and Stam 1998; Koch and Gartner 2005). Over the time, democratic governments have experienced total wars related to high casualties and domestic dissents and have had organizational memory regarding sensitivities to casualties (Kim and James 2010).

As an example of domestic conditions, military structures can make political leaders’ different sensitivities to casualties within democratic countries. Vasquez III(2005) argues that democratic leaders with conscript military structure are more sensitive to casualties rather than leaders with voluntary military structure. In conscript system, militaries are more closely related to society compared to voluntary system. Therefore,
democratic elites with conscription are more likely to be influenced by social groups’ reactions than democratic leaders with voluntary system. This implies that a democracy with conscription is more vulnerable to state-society tension when rising combat casualties compared to a democracy with voluntary system. These different sensitivities to casualties among democratic allies can seriously deteriorate wartime collaboration and then become transaction costs of democratic alliance. Because of different sensitivity levels to casualties, a democratic ally with less sensitivity to casualties may accept risk relating to wartime objectives, while other allies suffering higher sensitivity to casualties prefer risk-averse goals. As a result, different domestic conditions within democratic alliance induce different risk propensities. This means that it is not easy for democratic alliance to make wartime intra-alliance consensus.

However, despite the different domestic conditions, matured democratic alliance is more likely to reach wartime intra-alliance consensus than other types of alliance by the choice collective options that all members can accept. A matured democratic alliance has shared democratic values and norms over long time periods and all member countries can recognize each other’s transparent domestic decision-making systems. Shared democratic values and norms enable member countries to solve conflict with non-violent instruments under the same identity. Due to transparency, democratic allies can enjoy better understanding about each other. As a result, matured democratic alliance can establish a cooperative community between member countries beyond their own extension of national interests (Risse-Kappen 1995; Reiter and Stam 2002). In this community, “(alliance) as an institution is explicitly built around norms of democratic decision-making, that is,
nonhierarchy, frequent consultation implying co-determination, and consensus-building (Risse-Kappen 1995, 36)” In addition, matured democratic alliance has expanded communication channels and personnel exchanges between member countries so that there are various possible ways of consultation and management in each issue-area. Therefore, intra-alliance bargaining in matured democratic alliance results in an agreement that all member countries can accept rather than powerful ally’s dominated decisions.

In this circumstance, domestic pressure in each member country of matured democratic alliance is a key factor to determine collective decision because all member countries tend to select compromise in order to deal with each member’s domestic pressure. So an ally with serious domestic pressure has better intra-alliance bargaining position (Putnam 1993; Resnick 2010/11). For example, the history of NATO shows a certain relationship between the U.S. and European allies as a matured democratic alliance. In 1979, the U.S. Carter Administrative decided to establish Rapid Deployed Force to Gulf area to prepare rising regional threats resulted from Iranian Revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Because the U.S. planned to use U.S. forces in Europe when dispatching Rapid Deployed Force to Gulf area, the U.S. requested that European allies increase their own reserve force levels and provide transportation capabilities. In terms of power balance between the U.S. and European allies, these requests of the U.S. were critical pressure to European NATO member countries. However, under the recessions of European economy, Britain, France, and West Germany suffered low growth rate and high unemployment. At the same time, public opinions in European countries are unlikely to support for increases in defense expenditures necessary to accept U.S. requests. In this
situation, although the U.S. was the most powerful leading ally and had provided security services to European allies, the U.S. made compromise with other allies rather than coercive pressure. In fact, after the consecutive consultations within NATO from 1980 to 1982, as a collective agreement, European allies did not increase any force level or burden sharing (Kupchan 1988).

Likewise, within matured democratic alliance, even junior ally with serious domestic pressure can have stronger bargaining position than that of powerful ally. Because of shared democratic values, norms, and transparency, intra-alliance bargaining of matured democratic alliance countries is different from that of non-democracies. The intra-alliance consensus of matured democratic alliance comes from the choice of collective options that even member country with serious domestic pressure can accept. Therefore, in wartime, matured democratic alliance tends to choose risk-averse military option that all member countries can agree regardless of each own different sensitivities to combat casualties. In other words, democratic alliance chooses to the risk-averse option with low casualties in order to maintain wartime intra-alliance consensus.

Single Cut Casual Effect Test

As previously stated, different domestic conditions within democratic alliance can make transaction costs decreasing probability of victory in a militarized dispute. As a typical example, different military structure in democratic alliance also creates transaction costs and thereby decreases likelihood of winning. Therefore, it is necessary to test casual effect of different military structures among democratic allies on dispute outcomes. As a
single cut test for this causal effect, I deduce a testable hypothesis. *In a militarized dispute, democratic partners with different military structures are less likely to win a dispute rather than those with similar military structures.*

For the empirical test, I use large N statistical analysis for empirical regularities. In order to sustain theoretical arguments, empirical propositions should survive in the test using natural history (Singer 2000; Bennett and Stam 2000). To test the causal argument in here, the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute (DYDMID) 2.0 data set (Maoz 2005) is used. Using this data set, I construct binomial logit model for testing hypothesis.

Then, I select democracies’ militarized dispute cases in which at least two democracies are involved as partners from 1963 to 1994 in order to capture the variation of military structure within democratic partners. It is designed to correctly test the effect of similarity of military structure among democratic partners on the outcome of militarized disputes. Then I construct democracies’ initiator and target models because in a militarized dispute, initiator differs from target in terms of strategic choice. Existing research suggested that initiator has a more optimistic expectation and is more resolved. Also initiators can select targets, so it has advantages such as better preparation of war plans and operational initiative i.e. surprise attack (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Stam 1994). Because of this different strategic condition between initiator and target, effect of initiator’s and target’s attributes on the outcome of disputes differs.

As dependent variable, victory and defeat are defined according to the Correlate of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data set. Because the outcome is measured as binary variable, I use binary logit model for test. The COW MID data set
provides six outcome categories: victory, yield, stalemate, compromise, released, and unclear (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). In this data set, the initiator achieves its objective when the data set indicates that (1) the initiator obtains a victory; (2) the target yields; and (3) both disputants reach a compromise (Sullivan and Gartner 2006). Thus, “victory for side A,” “yield by side B,” and “stalemate” are considered as the initiator’s victory. For the target, “victory for side B,” “yield by side A,” are coded as the target’s victory, and other values are considered as defeat respectively.

For the test, the military structure is measured by a ratio of air force to army manpower. I divide air force manpower by the sum of air force and army manpower in each country. In a democracy, the size of army is closely related to large number of stakeholders who sensitively suffer casualties from military actions. Under this condition, those stakeholders have incentive to avoid risks on foreign policy that can entail a large number of casualties that would be costly for many citizens. Military structure may covariate with military manpower system in a country, because existence of conscript in a country may be related to the need for more number of army manpower. Nevertheless, the military structure is a better indicator than military manpower institution because it can more precisely capture variation of military system rather than comparison between two typologies (conscript vs. voluntary).

Although military expenditure might be another indicator that captures the military structure, there is significant limitation of data because each country uses different standard to calculate its own military expenditure. It is difficult to calculate whole countries’ military expenditure by the use the same standard. So, existing data of military expenditure seems
not to be reliable. Furthermore, manpower data not only provide more reliable indicator to
represent power balance between military branches in each country, but also easily capture
citizen-soldier relationship in a society.

The number of manpower comes from annual issues of The Military Balance\(^1\). Due
to limited data source, the test time span is designed from 1963 to 1994. Based on these
characteristics, I simply measure the type of military organization by the ratio of air force
manpower to army manpower. Despite the fact that both air force and navy are technology
oriented military branches, the size of navy manpower is more likely to be influenced by
the geographical characteristics rather than that of air force, because political leaders and
social groups in maritime oriented geographical circumstance can have strong incentives to
increase the size of navy compared to other type of geostrategic environment. Therefore,
the ratio of air force manpower to army manpower can more accurately reflect the type of
military structure.

For measurement of democracy, I use the “polity 2” regime score which ranges
from -10 (highly autocratic) to 10 (highly democratic) of the POLITY IV Project (Marshall
and Jaggers 2000). I select states with a polity regime score greater than 6 as a democracy.
Although there is a debate regarding the use of a dichotomous coding of democracy and
continuous measure of democracy, democracy is qualitatively different from non-
democracies so that it is possible to use dichotomous measures. In terms of the cut point,
the empirical distribution of regime types over all interstate dyads shows that the polity
score tends to cluster into a large number of dyads above scale 6 (Bennett 2006). As a result,

\(^1\) The manpower data source is International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military
several scholars choose the polity score 6 as a cut point in dichotomous democracy (Rousseau et al. 1996; Senese 1997; Schultz 1999; Huth and Allee 2002).

For primary independent variable, difference of military structure among wartime democratic partners is measured by the standard deviation of all democratic partner’s ratio of air force to army manpower in each militarized dispute. Because the standard deviation represents variance of values, the higher value the variable has, the more likely difference is significant. Thus, the increase of value in this variable represents the difference of military structures among democratic partners.

As control variables, I consider capability, major power status, and contiguity. First, the capability variable is measured by the COW project’s composite capabilities index (Small and Singer 1982). This variable represents industrial, demographic, and military capabilities in a state. In existing literature, the preponderance of national capabilities are important determinant of victory (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Merritt and Zinnes 1989; Stam 1996). Also, in order to capture the effect of power status of each country on dispute outcomes, I generate Major power status variable which directly comes from the COW project data set. This variable is coded “1” when a major power is involved in a militarized dispute. Otherwise, it is coded “0”.

The contiguity variable represents the geographical proximity between disputants. Contiguous dyads are more likely to fight each other than non-contiguous dyads because shared access to a physical area can lead to interstate friction that would become violence (Bremer 1992). The contiguity variable is measured by six categories including the COW data set’s five types of state-to-state contiguity: land contiguity or separated by 12, 24, 150,
or 400 miles or less of water (Gochman 1991). The sixth category indicates that the states are not contiguous. I transform the fifth and sixth categories into a noncontiguous category and the others into a contiguous category in order to generate one dummy variable.

The effect of similarity of military structures between democratic partners on the outcome of militarized dispute appears in Table 1. The difference of military structure reveals significantly negative relationship with the victory of disputes in both initiator and target models. This means that democratic partners who do not share similar military structure are more likely to fail in a militarized dispute. As discussed before, different military structure induces the distinct sensitivity on casualties causing separate wartime policy positions among democratic partners. This different policy positions can deteriorate wartime cooperation and decrease the chance of victory.

Table 1. Effect of Democratic Partners’ Military Structure on Dispute Outcome, 1963-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Initiator Model</th>
<th>Target Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference of military structure</td>
<td>-0.027(0.007)**</td>
<td>-0.008(0.003)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>-1.979(1.616)</td>
<td>-2.533(1.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power</td>
<td>1.559(1.032)</td>
<td>-0.032(0.983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>1.368(1.756)</td>
<td>-2.556(0.986)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.585(2.410)**</td>
<td>3.257(1.079)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-6.764</td>
<td>-26.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>14.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Wald chi-square test for independent equations is significant. Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 0.1%; ** at 0.05%; *** at 0.01%
The empirical test shows that the difference between democratic partners' military structures decreases the probability of victory in a dispute, ceteris paribus. Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of different military structures among democratic partners on the probability of victory. This result empirically supports the hypothesis.

Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Military Structure in Initiators on Probability of Victory

In initiator side, the probability of victory is gently decreased when increasing the difference of military structure among democratic partners. Because initiators have intrinsically strategic advantage, the probability of victory is not steeply decreased.
Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Military Structure in Targets on Probability of Victory

Figure 4 describes target democracies’ marginal effect of different military structure on probability of victory. Because of target’s strategic disadvantage, this indicates tremendously drop of probability of victory when initially increasing difference of military structure. As shown in Figure 3 and 4, the more difference of military structure in democratic partners, the more likely that probability of victory is decreased. Both Initiator and Target models show that reverse relationship between probability of victory and different military structure among democratic partners. This implies that wartime performance of formal alliance between democracies is significantly affected by the levels of difference in domestic conditions between allies. As stated before in war termination logic, different domestic conditions with democratic alliance become transaction costs deteriorating collective operation capabilities. Therefore, democratic alliance needs to establish intra-alliance consensus and minimize transaction costs in order to win militarized disputes.
Democratic Alliance’s Pattern of Using Force: Kosovo War 1999

Background of Kosovo War

In order to reduce transaction costs and maintain wartime intra-alliance consensus, matured democratic alliance tends to choose risk-averse military option with low casualties that every ally can accept. As an example of matured democratic alliance, I select the case of NATO’s Allied Force Operation against Serbia in Kosovo 1999. Because NATO member countries’ domestic conditions differ from each other, there had been many complicated intra-alliance interactions among member countries. Before the war, Serb leader, Milosevic, anticipated dismantlement of NATO’s collective military operation due to rupture between NATO member countries (Posen 2000; Henriksen 2007). At the same time, as a matured democratic alliance, NATO made significant efforts to maintain intra-alliance consensus and minimize transaction costs. NATO chose risk-averse military option that all main member countries can accept and continued fighting until Serbia comes back to negotiation.

Since post-Tito period, there were sequential declarations of independence of former Yugoslavia republics, such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Along these events, Kosovo Albanians, majority of population in Kosovo republic, had attempted independence from former Yugoslavia and Serbia tried to deprive existing autonomy of Kosovo. During 1990s, whereas Kosovo Albanians established Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to implement small-scale guerilla warfare against Serb-dominated Yugoslavia National Army, Serbia started brutal offensive actions by the use of formal institutional authority in Kosovo. By beginning of 1998, Serbian violence had culminated to massacres so NATO treated this issue and began to review several possible options including military
intervention. As a result, NATO implemented a military intervention against Serbia in order to halt Serb brutal actions in Kosovo from 24 March to 10 June in 1999.

During the Operation Allied Force, NATO’s military strategies were frequently managed or intervened by each member countries’ political considerations. Also NATO member countries’ collective political guidance for military operation was sometimes unclear (Henriksen 2007). In addition, primary NATO member countries’ policy positions differ from one another (Auerswald 2004). In reality, five main NATO member countries, the U.S., U.K, France, Germany, and Italy provided the majority of forces during the military campaign, but they suffered different domestic conditions such as public opinion, internal power balance, and military structure.

**Domestic Conditions of Main NATO Member Countries**

**U.S.:** In terms of internal power balance, the U.S. elites consensus is based on the relationship between White House and Congress. Although the U.S. Senate approved air campaign in Kosovo on 23th March, the House did not make clear position whether or not to support Kosovo War. During the wartime, the House refused either to oppose or endorse the war (Singh 2001; Auerswald 2004). The House did not approve ongoing air campaign even after commencement of war, but approved to use defense budget for war (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). American political elites between White House and Congress did not reach consensus because the position of Congress was unclear. Therefore, U.S. President Clinton cannot expect full range of support from Congress despite the fact that Congress did not oppose military intervention. Nevertheless, public opinion showed that American
public agreed with the need of military intervention but believed that there was no vital interest in Kosovo. According to polls for ABC News, from April to June in 1999, 56, 54, and 55 percent, respectively, of responders supported U.S. military intervention (Singh 2001). Although American public generally interpreted Kosovo war as a just war to stop ethnic cleaning and to protect minority, narrow majorities supported military intervention. Furthermore, the U.S. has highly technology oriented military structure with voluntary manpower system so that the sensitivity to casualties is relatively lower than that of other allies. In sum, U.S. public opinion and military structure are impetus to lead military intervention to Kosovo, but unclear Congress support is obstacle to U.S. military operation in oversee. As a result, the U.S. provided a large number of aircrafts for military operations and led air campaign planning but was reluctant to proclaim ground invasion.

**U.K.** : During the wartime, U.K. strongly supported all possible military options including ground invasion. According to characteristics of parliamentary system, British prime minister enjoys the full range of support from the majority party in the parliament so has strong authority to establish foreign policy when parliamentary confidence remains (Auerswarld 2004). In 1999, the incumbent Labor Party led by Prime Minister Tony Blair wanted to show its own expertise and professionalism in defense policy area. Since Labor Party decided to support nuclear disarmament policy during the Cold War, they have been considered as an immature political party in defense issue area by rival political parties. In fact, the Conservative Party often criticized the Labor Party’s weakness in defense issues during general elections in 1982, 1987, and 1992 (Richardson 2000). Therefore, Labor Party had an incentive to reveal enthusiasm in military intervention to Kosovo in order to
remove its own weak image in defense issues. Additionally, British public strongly supported military intervention as shown that 67 percent of responders supported Kosovo war in May, 1999 (Richardson 2000). In short, British intention to dispatch forces to Kosovo had been popularly supported by both public opinion and political parties. Also, British military structure is technology oriented structure with full voluntary manpower system similar with that of the U.S. so that British leaders were less sensitive to expected combat casualties than other democratic allies. As a result, the U.K. strongly supported both air campaign and ground invasion during the wartime. Indeed, British Prime Minister Blair and Defense Minister Robertson severally suggested that NATO needs to take ground campaign option beyond current air strike (Clarke 2001).

**France:** In 1999, France was still not a formal member of NATO, but in reality France was a de factor ally in terms of military contribution and the role in collective decision process. French leaders have considered the material contribution to military intervention of NATO as an opportunity to strengthen French leadership in Europe. At the same time, French internal political power was divided into President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin because it was cohabitation time between Left and Right. This political coalition could capture a broad range of political ideology so that it became source to create various supports from both Left and Right when deciding to start military intervention to Kosovo (Macleod 2000; Mcallister 2001). Furthermore, public opinion was too emotional to be clearly interpreted whether they strongly support or not to military intervention (Macleod 2000). Although public opinion strongly supported military intervention at the commencement of air campaign, French public changed their attitude to be favorable to
negotiation less than a month into the war. Generally, French public showed relative lower support to military intervention than the U.S. and U.K. (Macleod 2000). In fact, French support for war was fragile and confused. French military structure is relatively less technological oriented style compared to those of U.S. and U.K. Although French military reform plan, Loi Programmation Militaire (LPM), aimed to abandon conscript system, France possessed conscript army until November 2001 (Salmon and Shephered 2003). Those factors formulated French policy position as moderate support for military intervention. While France continued to support air campaign, French leaders suggested the delay of commencement of ground invasion option.

**Germany:** Since the end of World War 2, German political military culture has been based on antimilitarism and commitments to human right. Although Kosovo War was related to human right issue to eradicate massacre in Europe, it would be in conflict with political military culture to oppose foreign military intervention. In addition, in 1999, German government was characterized as a coalition government including Social Democrat Party and Green Party which had traditionally opposed military intervention. Although other conservative coalition partners could accept controlled military intervention, it was not easy for German Chancellor Schroeder to make consensus with Red-Green coalitions in terms of military intervention. On the contrary, the public attitude was positively related to decision of military intervention because the poll showed that 60% of responders supported military operation in April, 1999 (Rudolf 2000). Nevertheless, the public opinion strongly denied the option of ground campaign. German military structure was still characterized as conscript system because one third of total military were conscript
soldiers (Salmon and Shepherd 2003). Therefore, its military structure is less technology oriented compared to U.S. and U.K. so German political elites seemed to be more sensitive to combat casualties than those two allies. During the wartime, Germany provided limited size of force to the Kosovo and clearly denied ground invasion option.

**Italy:** During the Cold War, the Italian government had contributed to the development of NATO and considered the alliance as an efficient instrument to maintain security tie with the U.S. However, in 1999, Italian Prime Minister D’Alema had confronted serious domestic antiwar moods and political oppositions. Because Kosovo is geographically closed to Italy, NATO’s military operations using many Italian bases may deteriorate Italian domestic economy and security. During the wartime, NATO aircrafts used Adriatic coast as drop area for mission aborted bombs so that Italian fishermen and tourist operators suffered from war efforts (Clark 2001). Furthermore, because Italian air force bases and facilities were used as main locations for NATO air strike, Italian politicians and public recognized additional responsibility of antiterrorist and police activities (Cremasco 2000). Those impressions from political parties became strong obstacles to Prime Minister D’Alema led center-left coalition government’s war efforts. Additionally, beyond opposition of left wing parties, there were public peace protests. These peace protests were connected with traditional anti-American sentiment and Roman Catholic Church publicly proclaimed opposition position of Kosovo War and tried to end war (Clark 2001). During the wartime, Italian public opinion was unclear. Whereas 50 percent of respondents did not support military intervention, 75 percent of respondents agreed with Italian participation in military operations of NATO (Clark 2001). In terms of
military structure, Italian system characterized by partial conscription is similar with those of France and Germany in 1999. Although Italian military reform plan focused on enhancement of mobility and decrease of ground force size, conscript system remained until 2004 (Cabigiosu 2006). This characteristic of military structure leads political elites to have stronger sensitivity to combat casualties than U.S. and U.K. As a result, Italian government participated in military intervention under a limited way. Although Italy provided military facilities and air force bases in its own homeland, it limited to support for air campaign and opposed to the idea of ground campaign.

In sum, during the wartime, five democratic NATO member countries had different domestic conditions in terms of internal power balance, public opinions, and military structure as shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Conditions</th>
<th>Military Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Labor Party Government’s intention to show professionalism</td>
<td>Voluntary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support of ground campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Unclear support of Congress</td>
<td>Voluntary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cohabitant government</td>
<td>Conscript system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ideological reluctance</td>
<td>Conscript system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Red-Green Coalition dislikes military intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Due to geopolitical contiguity with Kosovo, concern about collateral damage</td>
<td>Conscript system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These differences could be source of transaction costs when NATO tried to perform military intervention in Kosovo. At that time, Serb leader Milosevic expected that transaction costs among NATO member countries increase over time if Serbia continues to choose fighting.

Choice of Risk-Averse Military Option in NATO

As shown in Table 2, NATO needed to maintain wartime intra-alliance consensus under the situation of various domestic conditions among member countries in order to minimize transaction costs. In the Kosovo war, debates for NATO’s collective military options had been divided into three stages. At the first stage, main NATO member countries had developed military options during the negotiation period at Rambouillet near Paris between February and March. After three days of air campaign, the second stage of debate of collective military options appeared. At that time, NATO member countries discussed how much air strike target list is expanded in late March. At the third stage, NATO started a debate whether to start ground invasion from late April.

First, before the commencement of war, NATO member countries suggested several military options. During the Rambouillet talk in February, both Britain and France provided the option to send ground force as peacekeeping mission to Kosovo and requested the participation of the U.S. However, U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen said that “a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo could be more difficult than Bosnia ” (Kaufman 2002,174). U.S. Clinton Administration publicly denied British and French suggestions because sending ground troops requires Congressional approval. In U.S. Congress, Benjamin Gilman, chair of the
House International Relations Committee said “Such solutions do not eliminate the underlying problem. They promise to drag on indefinitely, at high cost to our nation” (Kaufman 2002, 180). Therefore, U.S. President Clinton publicly announced that he did not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war on March 24 (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 97).

In short, before the start of war which is the first stage, there were two possible military options in NATO. Whereas Britain and France suggested air campaign combined with sending ground force as peacekeeping mission, the U.S. preferred sole air campaign. At the same time, Italy was less enthusiastic to start war and German position about military intervention was unclear. Therefore, it was difficult for NATO to create intra-alliance consensus by the use of military options including ground operation because ground campaign entails combat casualties cost. As a result, the choice of sole air campaign was an acceptable military option that most NATO member countries can agree because it is a risk-averse military option to minimize combat casualties. Thus, NATO chose only air campaign and could make intra-alliance consensus that every member countries join to military operation. After the war, Sandy Berger, U.S. president security advisor mentioned that taking out ground operation at the start of war was important decision. In fact, “this administration was operating on the assumption ground troops would raise this to a new level, and we hadn’t prepared public that or gotten the allies on board [said by one US official who deeply involved in the planning for Kosovo War]” (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 97).

Second, NATO’s air bombing operation was designed as three implementing phases
in order to escalate pressure gradually. The Phase One was aimed to neutralize Serb anti-aircraft defense capabilities and to degrade command and control systems. The Phase Two target list focused on Serb military capability in Kosovo and the Phase Three targets included Serb leadership and infrastructure located beyond a latitude of forty-four degree north (Henriksen 2007). After the first three days of air strike, the goals of Phase One were successfully achieved. At that time, NATO member countries shared an assumption that Milosevic could give up his intention to oppose NATO and comes back to peace agreement talk after a few days of air strike (Kaufman 2002; Henriksen 2007). This assumption is based on historical experiences that Milosevic agreed with start of peace talk shortly after NATO bombing in Bosnia in 1995 and after threat of NATO military intervention in 1998. Therefore, NATO did not develop detailed military plan after the Phase One of air campaign. However, Milosevic continued fighting so NATO needed to move into the second phase of air campaign.

At that time, the U.S. wanted to conduct a much more aggressive bombing to expand target list including Serb leadership and infrastructure beyond 44 degree of latitude (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). Also, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Clark already asked to move to Phase Three at the same time. However several NATO member countries were reluctant to expand air operation into Phase Three and Greek military representative on NATO Military Committee denied targets beyond Phase One (Henriksen 2007). As a solution to compromise these different views within alliance, NATO decided to adopt Phase Two Plus instead of Phase Three. Therefore, Supreme Allied Commander took authority to strike targets belonging to Phase Two and NATO Secretary-General had a
authority to approve targets of Phase Three (Henriksen 2007). This is a choice of risk-averse military option to limit target list and to require political consultation for politically sensitive targets such as Serb leadership in Belgrade.

Third, despite the initial anticipation, Kosovo War had been prolonged and Serbian violence against ethnic Albanians had been continued. Therefore, NATO member countries confronted with criticism and skeptical evaluation from the public and media. In mid April, British Defense Minister Robertson suggested to start ground campaign and French President Chirac also mentioned the requirement of additional military options beyond air campaign (Auerswald 2004). Nevertheless, the U.S. hesitated to send ground troops unless domestic consensus established. Specifically, British Prime Minister Blair made continued efforts to persuade the U.S. position to accept ground operation options by the use of special relationship between two countries. However, German Chancellor Schroeder told that Germany can support only air campaign not ground campaign and Italian government agreed with German position (Kaufman 2002). These debates whether to use ground force in Kosovo began from mid April to end of May. During those time period, there were continuous opposition of ground campaign from several NATO member countries and then ground operation could not be accepted at any time. Because ground operation can entail combat casualties, several member countries were reluctant to take this risk-acceptance option. Therefore, NATO continued to choose sole air campaign as a risk-averse military option that every member can approve and then can continue fighting until Milosevic surrendered.

In sum, during the Kosovo War, NATO needed to select military options
throughout three stages from beginning to ending war. In each stage, there were possible military options reflecting different preferences of NATO member countries and NATO chose risk-averse military option promising low level of casualties as shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Possible Options</th>
<th>Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the war</td>
<td>-Air campaign including ground operation</td>
<td>Air campaign only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including peacekeeping operation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Air campaign only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After three days of air strike</td>
<td>-Large expansion of air strike targets</td>
<td>Controlled expansion of air strike targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Controlled expansion of air strike targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Mid April</td>
<td>-Start of ground invasion</td>
<td>Air campaign only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Air campaign only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the first stage, NATO had two possible options between air campaign combined with ground peacekeeping operation and sole air strike. Before the start of war, several member countries including the U.S. were reluctant to choose campaign plan containing peacekeeping mission because of possible combat casualties. After three days of air strike, some member countries wanted to control target list strictly by political authorities, whereas the NATO Supreme Allied Command intended to expand targets including sensitive facilities located in region forty-four degree of latitude of north. From the mid April, some member countries specifically U.K. strongly suggested to start ground operation in order to end war rapidly, while other members including Germany and Italy clearly objected ground campaign. In all stages, NATO’s collective choices are always risk-averse military options.
because sole air campaign and controlled selection of bombing targets prevent high level of casualties. NATO democratic member countries have different domestic conditions in terms of public opinion, internal power balance, and military structure so they differently assessed situation and had different preferences about military options. As a matured democratic alliance, NATO member countries’ collective decisions come from compromise concerning domestic pressure in allies rather than leading countries’ forceful pressure. Therefore, NATO chooses risk-averse military options that allies with serious domestic circumstance can take. As a result, NATO can minimize transaction costs and maintain intra-alliance consensus so they continue fighting until favorable settlement that Milosevic comes back to negotiation table.

**Conclusion**

In terms of war termination logic, amount of total costs associated war is connected with war outcome. Using this logic in the context of alliance, the variation in domestic conditions affects the sensitivity to casualties in democracies and generates transaction costs between allies thereby influencing the outcome of militarize disputes. This finding provides a policy implication on how to reduce transaction costs between wartime democratic allies. Although military strategy has been generally selected in order to destroy enemy forces in battles, sometimes democratic alliance could not accept best military strategy due to wartime transaction costs between allies. Therefore, democratic alliances have an incentive to take risk-averse military options with low casualties that member countries can accept in order to minimize transaction costs. Furthermore, in matured
democratic alliance, an ally having domestic pressure has stronger bargaining position than powerful ally so that democratic alliance tends to choose risk-averse military options that an ally with domestic pressure can accept.

In Kosovo war, NATO selected risk-averse military options to reduce casualties so that NATO can carefully deal with their member countries’ different domestic conditions such as institutional power balance, public opinion, and military structure. This means that democratic alliances’ selection of risk-averse military options is a strategic choice in order to minimize transaction costs and increase probability of victory in a militarized dispute. Therefore, NATO selected sole air campaign in order to minimize casualties in Kosovo war and then can continue fighting until Serbia gave up its own resolve. NATO’s experiences well reflect both democratic countries’ regime characteristics and democratic alliance’s collective behaviors in wartime.

This study focusing on democratic alliance’s pattern of using forces can extend existing findings about effect of democratic regime types on wartime foreign policy behaviors. When alliance is transformed into a matured democratic alliance, allies’ collective decisions become similar with each democratic country’s pattern of using forces. This theoretical expansion can bring policy implication when democratic alliance prepares collective decisions. In matured democratic alliance, the choice of military strategy is much influenced by domestic pressure rather than external threat. Therefore, policy planners in democratic alliance should consider alliance partners’ domestic condition equally to external threat.
References


Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Aftermath. edited by Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings. New York: Continuum.
Slantchev, Branislav. 2004. “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and
Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil wars,
Smith, Alastair. "To Intervene or Not To Intervene: A Biased Decision" Journal of Conflict
Smith, Leonard V. 1997. “Remobilizing the Citizen-Soldier through the French Army
Mutinies in 1917.” in State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First
Stam, Allan C. 1996. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sullivan, Patricia and Scott Gartner. 2006. “Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and
Vasquez III, Joseph P. 2005. “Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and