International Intervention in a Networked, Fragmented, and Interdependent World:
New Imperatives for the International System

“Unless we aim for the seemingly unattainable, we risk settling for mediocrity”
(Sergio Vierira de Mello)

“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there”
(Lewis Carroll)

“The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order”
(Alfred North Whitehead)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the author’s professional experience in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, both countries undergoing international intervention, to assess what is required to increase the effectiveness of the foreign assistance for governance under these circumstances. Over the past twenty years, there have been profound changes in the field of international development as well as in the international system. Important elements of these changes include a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of state and non-state actors, growth and persistence of intrastate conflict, rising expectations of citizens of their governments and the international community, the establishment of governance as a new global norm, the rise of new powers with a commensurate increase in new international donors, formation of new regional and international institutions along with transnational networks, and a likelihood that international interventions with a whole of government approach (development, diplomatic, and defense) will continue. In this transformed and more independent world, a shift in the conceptual framework for international intervention is required. It is no longer possible to approach this change in a linear, sequential manner, with the “more is better” approach of only improvements in management, communication, etc.; future approaches must be based on assumptions of complexity, both of the international system that has grown beyond the framework established after World War II, and of the countries undergoing intervention, which are socially fractured, with weak formal institutions, and a heavy reliance on informal institutions and alliances where a careful balancing of resources is needed to avoid simplistic solutions that themselves cause more conflict. Approaching the international interventions as dual complex adaptive systems – one system as the intervention apparatus and the other as the country undergoing the intervention – is a necessary prerequisite to gaining a deeper understanding of what is required for more effective use of the resources and achieving more sustainable, positive change, while still maintaining performance and accountability. The paper provides key recommendations for further academic research, policy changes in the international system, and additions to international agreements governing international interventions.
Background and Introduction

In each of my subsequent resident assignments in Asia, starting in Bangladesh in the early 1990s, in Mongolia in the mid-1990s after the transition to democracy, in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, in Timor-Leste following the establishment of a new independent country in the early 21st century, and in Afghanistan from 2010-2013, in the aftermath of the surge and following President Obama’s announcement of the withdrawal in 2014, I witnessed the gradual transformation of the international development field and the operating environment for foreign assistance dedicated to governance. Further, my professional arc led to assignments in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste during periods of the multi-faceted international intervention, which not only compounded the challenges of achieving governance-related goals and objectives, but also highlighted and magnified changes in the development field within an evolving international order.

The research for this paper started out as a reflection on my experiences in Asia, from more straightforward “development” in Bangladesh, to work in Mongolia and Indonesia, countries in transition, to work in Afghanistan (2010-2013) and Timor-Leste (2003-2007), both undergoing international intervention. Although there was much that remained the same on a day-to-day basis working for an international NGO that managed grants, technical assistance, and directly implemented program initiatives in the areas of governance, women’s empowerment, regional relations, and economic policy reform with domestic governmental and non-governmental organizations, there were also dramatic differences: more money, more actors, more diverse, defined, and shifting foreign policy and political interests, and more complex and complicated goals and objectives. While Timor-Leste was my introduction to the world of international intervention, Afghanistan was a dramatic comparative experience, equivalent to leaping into a seething cauldron. The two together provided an excellent point-counterpoint for examining the two experiences and drawing conclusions about what is required in order to increase the effectiveness of the foreign assistance for governance in countries undergoing international intervention.

The research journey revealed some sobering conclusions – first that the challenge of the day-to-day in any country undergoing international intervention, while professionally challenging and
fulfilling, is not conducive to professional development through keeping up with the literature, having substantive discussions, etc. In my fellowship year, Harvard libraries provided rich access to the varied writings on various elements of the international interventions in both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, which allowed the possibility of “catching up” and addressing huge gaps in my knowledge and conceptual understanding. (It also revealed key major management issues in Afghanistan, with gaps in international donors/etc. informing the “implementers” about new or updated international agreements and how that might re-frame the strategies, approaches, focus, expected results, etc.)

The second realization had several related dimensions: one that I was more influenced than I realized by the trap of linear, sequential thinking; the second is the dire status of the public policy/academic relationship; and the third, the profound change in the international operating environment. For my own linear, sequential thinking, this was greatly influenced by the growing donor trend of measuring results, even for complex undertakings, in a numerical manner. My academic explorations revealed the growing divide between public policy (and therefore practitioners) and academia on the change process. The gap between academia and the public policy worlds has grown for many reasons, but among the more concrete are the acute specialization of the academic world. Additionally, in an appropriate drive for accountability, it has tended toward more and more numerical or technical measures of results/outcomes for what are exceptionally complex processes with underlying embedded assumptions (both recognized and unrecognized). Coupled with my analysis of trends and trajectories predicting more international interventions, country circumstances requiring complex interventions, more state and non-state actors, and an international structure that has not necessarily evolved from its World War II formation, there are real implications for improvements in foreign assistance for governance in cases of international intervention.

While there are definitely operational and managerial elements that need attention, more fundamentally, a shift in the conceptual framework for international intervention is required. It is no longer possible to approach change in a linear, sequential manner, with the “more is better”, with improvements in management, communication, etc.; future approaches must be based on assumptions of complexity, both of the international system that has grown beyond the
framework established after World War II, and of the countries undergoing intervention, which are socially fractured, with weak formal institutions, and heavy reliance on informal institutions and alliances, and require a careful balancing of resources in a more integrated fashion to avoid simplistic solutions that themselves cause more conflict.

This new conceptual framework has implications for the international system and also for the organization and management of international interventions. Global interdependence, fragmentation, and changing expectations require new ways of thinking about the system and interventions. Assuming more complexity leads to both policy recommendations as well as suggested areas of future interdisciplinary academic research that can help inform public policy. Now is an appropriate watershed for comparative analysis: with the Afghanistan withdrawal nearing later this year and the multiple other instances of international intervention over the past twenty plus years to draw from – including the retrospective analysis of the interventions in the Balkans near their 10-year anniversaries, it will be possible to gain a deeper understanding of how “complex systems” operate so that the international system can be modified for the realities and needs of the 21st century.

These two international interventions – especially the Afghanistan one - lead people to conclude that both are anomalies and the circumstances overarching the delivery of foreign assistance for governance will not be repeated. However, after discussions and analysis of several trends, it appears far more likely that the main factors will continue to exist (even if assuming that the scale and scope of the two particular international interventions, along with Iraq, will not be repeated). It is therefore crucial to analyze the framework for foreign assistance to governance in both post-conflict and in-transition countries in particular, and to identify any needed changes in the evolving international system itself or for cases of any future international interventions that may be led by an increasingly diverse set of global actors ranging from the UN to NATO to other regional organizations.

The global changes, along with my forecast of trends – more demands and expectations of governance fueled by more mobile populations, IT transformations and access, among others, that have led to a more widespread expectation for “global public goods” that place pressure on
sovereign governments to deliver (and indeed, if not delivered, could contribute to more destabilizing violence and conflict in already precarious environments) – and indicates that these trends will not be reversed, could accelerate, and require attention to a new paradigm that recognizes the new realities. In a dynamic field with multiple changing characteristics – more non-state actors, growing diversity of actors involved in development (along with state-building, reconstruction, peacebuilding, coping with fragility, etc.), and increase of traditional and non-traditional donors - the reality of implementing governance programs in countries undergoing international intervention created other challenges, i.e., simultaneous work on development initiatives in an environment where military or peacekeepers are attending to security, and involvement of military on a vast scale in the fields of development and governance that had previously been handled by civilian entities. The experience in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste magnified the global changes already underway, leading to the focus of my research paper.

**Underlying Assumptions and Rationale for the Paper**

Pressures on the international system: All sovereign governments face escalating pressures due to the changing expectations of citizens, with respect to growing diversity of stakeholders – proliferation of international institutions, conventions, regulations, etc.; transnational advocacy networks on various issues; and power of the masses. This alone complicates accountabilities. During an international intervention, there is another level of accountability, to the governments or international bodies signing the applicable agreements. There is a growing question of who is accountable for what, whose interests are taken into consideration, and ensuring that the legitimate accountability for outcomes and results does not absorb all of the resources of time, people, and funds devoted to achieving stated goals and objectives (i.e., does not become an end in and of itself at the expense of the focus governments and citizens).

*Why the focus on governance and why governance matters:* my professional career in international development parallels the trajectory of major global changes with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, with the corresponding expectation of cascading democratic change. The less-than-straightforward change process, with emergence of competitive autocracies and back-sliding in general, has had a positive impact in forcing a deeper
analysis of political development toward more open, pluralistic, representative, and accountable states. Although my work through the years focused on a political economy approach – ensuring insight, comprehension, and awareness of the underlying political culture of any one society undergoing change – my research has required further unpacking of exactly what is meant by “political culture”. For the purposes of this paper, it requires a more nuanced understanding of formal and informal rules, power relationships, and how things get done, within a context of formal political institutions, which impacts how assistance/change might be approached. This approach therefore considers not only laws/regulations but also the evolving re-definition of norms for the particular society.

Compared to previous years, in my experience there is less castigation of governance as either American or Western and therefore globalization-driven and crowding out local views. It would appear that we are approaching a period in history where these norms are more universal aspirations and standards.¹ Increasingly, it matters because if these aspirations are not met, they can themselves contribute to escalation of violence and conflict, which the interventions are intended to de-escalate and improve the ability of the country’s political institutions and leaders to resolve differences – either violent or non-violent. It matters fundamentally because the change process is always complicated and not straight-forward; moreover, in post-conflict and in transition countries, especially those with international intervention, there is a more complex set of factors and issues due to the simultaneous attention to security and/or peace-keeping. The lack of inclusive political institutions (Robinson and Acemoglu)² and gaps in the evolution of political institutions in the process of political change (Huntington)³ will both be sources of instability, with sometimes dire results, if not given proper attention in design and implementation of governance-related programs. The importance of a new “cohesive ‘national’ political community based on a unifying sense of national identity” as linked to political stability is also raised by Leach and Kingsbury, writing about Timor-Leste’s democratic consolidation.⁴

³ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006. (Foreword by Francis Fukuyama)
There are additional considerations for the governance of the international system, with a greater diversity of international, regional, and other actors.

For this paper, my working definition of “governance” is taken from Thomas Weiss’s seminal publication, *Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?:* a “…composite system of [formal and informal] authoritative values, rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies, and organizations through which an entity manages… its common affairs.”5 And to clarify on the meaning of “managing,” the World Bank’s definition of governance refers to both decision-making and to authority, i.e., how decisions are made and how authority is exercised.6

This paper avoids the use of the term “good governance” due to the neo-liberal origins of the term, but implicit in the use of the term “governance” is that it assumes pluralism, participation, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, and equitable provision of public services. This derives from my work in Asia, especially Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, as “governance” has begun to be used.7

As Grindle cites in her 2004 article, at that time “advocating good governance raises a host of questions about what needs to be done, when it needs to be done, and how it needs to be done,” as part of a paradigm surrounding the institutional preconditions for economic and political development and for poverty to be significantly reduced.8 In the field, and in my experience, the concept of “good governance” as linked to its neo-liberal origins, has taken on a life of its own as a new norm, delinking it as a means to an end, and becoming an end in and of itself for citizens in the countries in which I lived and worked. Thus, for political institutions and actors involved in delivery of or assistance in state-building, nation-building, policy-making, etc., making decisions about even “good enough governance”, which requires choices about prioritization of interventions with the requisite choices of apportioning the limited and / or never-sufficient

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5 Weiss, p. 31.
7 See Grindle (2007), pp. 556-557, for definitions of governance and good governance by international and bilateral organizations and authors.
resources of “money, time, knowledge, and human and organisational [sic] capacity,” increases the complexity of the ‘new normal’ of multi-dimensional international interventions.

A key work that was helpful in framing this research is the further work of Merilee Grindle, who wrote about two schools of political economy thought in “In Quest of the Political: The Political Economy of Development Policy Making.” She wrote that there has not been much focus of academics on the applicability of two key approaches, either rationale choice or comparative institutionalism, to developing and transitional countries. As countries in transition, with special circumstances of international intervention, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste are reflective of the politics of decision-making and the process of policy reform in a new institutional framework of political order. Direct observation over time in both countries indicates that “political behavior is always deeply rooted in context and specificity” and that they act within “complex environments that have roots in the past and that not only constrain and channel action but actually shape the perspectives, preferences, and values of the political actors.”

Central to this is the role of conflict as “ongoing interactions through which groups compete for predominance in particular, economic, social, and policy arenas and in which prior conflicts shape the nature of the current conflicts and determine the issues that are contested.” In pursuit of this “statecraft,” it will be instructive to study the manner in which “individual political actors or political entrepreneurs maneuver within institutional contexts to build coalitions, engineer consensus, negotiate, and bargain to generate new policies, new legislation, and new institutions,” where political actions are “shaped by institutions, which in turn are shaped by the actions of political agents.”

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11 Grindle (1999), p. 3.
In both country contexts, where the political institutions and order are in flux, these areas are how the new formal and informal rules of the game are being formulated, with an eye to who will control the distribution of economic and political power. In Timor-Leste, as the first new country of the 21st century, and Afghanistan, working under a new constitution promulgated in 2004 after 30 years of civil war and unrest, there are changing formal rules that may be unevenly implemented or followed but more importantly, a body of informal practices and assumptions that are embedded in “customs traditions, and cultural constraints…[that] connect the past with the present and future”\(^\text{16}\) and establish new norms of governance. In such dynamic situations of change, these may have spillover impacts that cause reallocation of alliances and constituencies of political actors that will have further impact on the political institutions, with potentially “reconfigured access to political, economic, and leadership resources.”\(^\text{17}\) In general terms, in neither of my focus countries was there sufficient attention to the changing international context and the globalization of the “governance” norm.

For both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, the importance of three factors that Grindle indicates have been insufficiently explained in both rationale choice and comparative institutionalism schools of political economy, are very visible: leadership, ideas/power, and success. In this regard, there two examples of where leadership mattered: for Timor-Leste’s survival, the Timorese leadership’s focus on maintaining good relations with Indonesia, the country’s largest trading partner and one of two points of international access for the remote island country, despite serious contentious views within the public and within the government itself, due to the country’s past history; and an Afghan minister in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)\(^\text{18}\) responsible for positive change. Expansion of this leadership focus, along with ideas/power, and success could be further explored for governance in the context of international intervention.


\(^{17}\) Grindle (1999), p. 11.

While Grindle rightly points out the growing influence of international institutions on domestic politics of developing and transitioning countries, in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, the pressure and challenge were much more acute: in the crowded field of actors during international intervention, with not only key political and military institutions, the multiplicity of non-state actors, the fragmentation of key political and military institutions (e.g., NATO member countries fielded their own contingents), there was considerable influence of an increasingly diverse set of international institutions on the countries’ domestic institutions which sometimes set up self-reinforcing conflicts as efforts expanded from national level to the local level, all exceedingly complex operating environments in their own rights.

Even established democracies are grappling with the proliferation of individual actors and networks that increasingly utilize social media to organize and disrupt, and lower the potential for consensus on political actions. As noted by David Brooks in his writing about the power of the swarm of individuals in global affairs, with a lowered trust in big institutions, the importance of individual leadership is crucial and further expanded by Moisés Naím of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s International Economics Program, in what he refers to as “micro-power.” His book, *The End of Power*, sets out the premise that formal political and military institutions, along with the increasing numbers of new state and non-state actors, transnational networks, and individuals, will need to accommodate to a new era of what Naím refers to as the three factors that denote the “end of power”: more (of everything – younger population than ever before, more urbanized populations, more information, travel, commerce, money…), mobility (beyond national borders, commerce, goods, money, people), and mentality (values, aspirations, and expectations). How decisions may be taken in domestic politics, let alone for the more complex challenges transcending borders (trafficking, cybercrime, etc.), requiring global cooperation, is a crucial dilemma for the global system.

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Under more normal circumstances, these trends would have major implications for domestic leaders and political institutions. In the case of countries undergoing international intervention, where there are international agreements providing an overarching framework for the intervention, this creates a fundamental challenge for the established international order that has been in effect since the World War II period. More pragmatically for actors in both countries, working with their domestic counterparts to advance development and in this case, governance, it has huge implications for accountabilities, communication structures, and helping to ensure the “unity of effort” implicit in the international agreements (e.g., Bonn Agreement and subsequent for Afghanistan, United Nations missions for Timor-Leste; see Appendix I for tables of the major international agreements for the two countries). The challenge grew over time, with successive agreements often having greatly expanded mandates. The expanded mandates may include new joint monitoring/accountability/oversight boards (e.g., Afghanistan’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board [JCMB], established in 2006 in keeping with the recommendations of the Afghanistan Compact, comprised of a carefully specified set of senior Afghan and international civilian and military leaders). However, proper due diligence and leadership is required to ensure that all actors are informed about the meetings’ outcomes, in order to take full advantage of the established accountability and oversight mechanisms and ensure that needed improvements or changes are carried out – rather than simply having another report on the shelf that does not contribute to a “unity of effort.” Comparatively, this was more present in Timor-Leste than Afghanistan in my experience.

Attention to these issues is important due to my forecast of key ongoing elements of our 21st century society. First, critical factors in the evolution of the international system as established after World War II and that have impact far beyond international development specifically. Second, factors related more specifically to analysis of development and governance-related efforts.

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Critical factors in the evolution and growing complexity of the international system:

*Complexity of the UN’s management and leadership:*

The complexity of the UN’s management and leadership today is much greater today compared to 1945 with almost four times as many nation states, complicating global governance:

- 1945, only 51 member states, with dramatic growth in subsequent years
- 60 in 1950
- 99 in 1960
- 127 in 1970
- 154 in 1980
- 159 in 1990
- 189 in 2000
- Now, 193 member states

*Increase in the number of new UN norms:*

There are many new UN norms, such as Right to Protect and the UN Human Rights Council’s new principles on business respecting human rights. Thus, while today’s citizens have greater expectations of government for accountability and transparency, increasing the pressure on national governments and leaders for being responsive, the international system also faces increased and broader sets of responsibilities for global governance.

*Increases in the number of international interventions:*

Since the 1990s, there have been many more global military, peacekeeping, and reconstruction efforts, with growing complexity with varying durations, levels of intensity, levels of resources, and composition of intervention.
Proliferation of actors:

- **International organizations** have greatly increased, with more United Nations’ and multi-lateral and regional fora. The listings for Afghanistan and Timor-Leste reflect this evolution. While the international intervention is governed by either inter-state agreements (Afghanistan) later ratified by the United Nations Security Council, or by resolutions originating in the United Nations Security Council (Timor-Leste), both countries are members of other groupings in the global international system. For instance, Timor-Leste is leading the G7+, is a member of the UN, G77, and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), is an official observer and actively pursuing full membership in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian States), and participates in the ADB, IBRD, IDA, IFC and IMF, UN, and WHO, among others. Afghanistan is a member of the G7+, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), is an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and participates in the ADB, IBRD, IDA, IFC and IMF, UN, WHO, and WTO, among others. This has not only increased the competition for the attention of over-stretched government institutions and limited human resources at critical times. It also has implications for accountabilities, competition, and coordination, and whose should take priority especially during the intensity of international interventions.

- **Non-state actors** are becoming more prominent globally and, alongside this, there is an increase and diversification of actors involved in foreign assistance that will continue.

  - Non-state actors are coming more prominent, diverse, numerous, and influential. The global trends reports of both the United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) note this trend and its implications. For NIC, this growing trend is highlighted as a major change in the international system in all of the 21st century *Global Trends* reports (2015/2000, 2020/2004, 2025/2008, and 2030/2012) and likewise in the
ESPAS Global Trends 2030 report. A working definition is: “non-sovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases, international level.” As with the growth in international bodies and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), this has implications for accountabilities, competition, and coordination, with fears of fragmentation leading to dysfunction if not given proper attention.

- The numbers and kinds of non-state actors are very fluid, but marked by the significant trend of the relative power of non-state actors increasing during a period of transition among world powers.

- For foreign assistance, this paper considers those involved in non-criminal activity. Among those most prominent in governance/development, NGOs and the private sector, they have different mandates that shape their approaches: NGOs with normative goals and objectives and the private sector, growth and profit. Those involved in criminal activity may be a major contributing factor to intrastate conflict, as described below.

**Recognition of micro-power:**

There must be a recognition of micro-power as an off-shoot of the above development, and a challenge to shepherding the demands/advocacy through political institutions, being positive contributions to change rather than to simply obstruct. Or, alternatively, to formulation of new

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25 Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States. DR-2007-16D. Washington DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007. p. 2. This paper focuses on NGOs and philanthropic super-empowered individuals who have normative goals and multinationals, which have profit and growth goals. In general, however, the non-state actors may also include trade unions, community organizations, religious institutions, ethnic groupings, and universities, etc. (p. 2)
norms of “network governance” and a set of guiding principles about their interaction with the nation state and its institutions with respect to authority, legitimacy, etc.

*Evolution of the international system for “keeping the peace” and work with the proliferation of fragile countries and societies:*

With changes in the global environment for conflict, the framework for dealing with it has evolved since the establishment of the UN in 1948. Representing the acute need for these changes is that since 1948, the UN has maintained 69 peacekeeping operations, with dramatic increase in the number of missions in the 1990s (35) and, as the missions have grown more complex, of longer duration. The change also reflects the growing reliance of the international community in using UN peacekeeping missions as a critical tool in managing the more complex crises that required multi-dimensional approaches. This expansion of the peacekeeping mission – where the “blue helmets” largely had a security role – into peacebuilding underscored the need for the UN to focus explicit attention on how to manage mandates ranging from immediate stabilization and safety of civilians, to humanitarian assistance, developing new political institutions, promoting security sector reform, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants, and otherwise creating the framework for an ongoing peace. Additionally, there needed to be recognition of the increasing numbers and diversity of organizations working alongside the UN.

The test facing the UN is captured in the Secretary General’s report on reform addressing the ineffectiveness of the UN in addressing “…the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.” A study commissioned by the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) in late 2004 set out key recommendations for the UN in a more robust approach to integrated missions that would result in more sustained peace. The key recommendations highlight specific needs in these areas: a) identification of the concept of “integrated missions” that require the role, function and form of these missions to be informed by

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the operational objectives that are based on “…a long-term strategy for building sustainable peace” (emphasis mine); mission planning and design; and leadership and management. Also important in the UN’s attention to the changing international context for ensuring international peace and security was the issuance in 2008 of the first-ever document on peacekeeping operations that formalized what it referred to as the “largely unwritten body of principles” governing peacekeeping missions since their inception.

These also formalized a critical expansion of the UN peacekeeping role, which through the Cold War helped to contain armed conflicts and settle them peacefully usually for interstate conflict. In modern day UN peacekeeping, the military component is now only one part of a comprehensive political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic effort. Unlike in the past, where the military supported the mission’s political objectives, the military may now support other governmental agencies as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in a broader set of goals and objectives spanning the security objectives as well as provision of humanitarian aid, organization and protection of elections, restoration and management of government institutions and functions, disarmament and demobilization, and repatriation of refugees. These expanded responsibilities beyond the traditional peacekeeping of the past more frequently involve intrastate conflict.

Coinciding with the UN’s attention to an evolving international context was the Organization for International Development’s (OECD) attention to fragile states. The OECD, established in 1960, to promote policies to improve global economic and social well-being, has its roots in the aftermath of World War II when its predecessor managed the Marshall Plan. Growing from its initial membership of 20 countries (chiefly European, plus the US and Canada), the OECD now has a 34-country membership that includes North America, Latin America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region, and has higher levels of engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. Also in 1960, the OECD created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as a forum for donor country consultations on aid to developing countries. Since that time, it has grown to take a more leading role in coordination of donor policies and to reach out beyond

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29 Eide, pp. 38-43.
OECD DAC membership. For instance, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) was endorsed by more than 100 countries and DAC has also engaged non-DAC or “emerging donors.”

The broadened approach of the OECD is signaled by two key developments: the first is its series of fora on aid effectiveness, begun in 2003, and the second is endorsement of a set of guidelines for principled engagement with fragile countries in 2007.

The OECD’s fora on aid effectiveness were instigated as a means of improving achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) endorsed in 2000 by the then 189 United Nations members and nearly 25 international organizations. In many circles the eight MDGs have been criticized for being too ambitious to achieve by 2015 and hard to measure, but nonetheless, represented a break-through in formalizing broad global development goals and objectives:

1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. To achieve universal primary education
3. To promote gender equality and empower women
4. To reduce child mortality
5. To improve maternal health
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. To ensure environmental sustainability
8. To develop a global partnership for development

The fora on aid effectiveness are important for several reasons. They are both more inclusive of different types of organizations and in reaching beyond OECD DAC membership. As a result, while they may be non-binding for the non-OECD DAC members, they represent a significant movement to ascribing to a new set of global norms for aid for the global community. The evolution is captured in the key achievements and agreements in each of the high-level fora:

**2002/Rome** – in the First High-Level Forum, participants for the first time identified principles for aid effectiveness that were set out in the Rome Declaration.
**2005/Paris** – the Second High-Level Forum on Joint Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness was instrumental in setting out donor and recipient accountability for their commitments and setting out an action plan for harmonization, alignment, and results. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness also establishes a monitoring system to assess progress.

**2008/Accra** – the Third High-Level Forum represents a break-through in broadening the participation beyond OECD DAC member countries, to include developing countries, emerging donors, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds, and civil society. The Accra Agenda for Action has served as the foundation for later commitments, including the Bogota Statement on effective aid principles for South-South cooperation; Istanbul Principles on the role of civil society; and the Dili Declaration on effective aid in fragile and conflict-affected states.

**2011/Busan** – the Fourth High-Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, South Korea, by far the most inclusive of the aid effectiveness gatherings as it included more than 3,000 participants. One of the most notable achievements is the formation of the “Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,” which represents agreement among the international community to improve the effectiveness of the multilateral system in development assistance. This represents a significant shift, in that for the first time, outcomes for development are assessed, and not simply aid effectiveness more technically. The partnership document also successfully accommodates the political needs of many donors in ensuring that the funds are spent in accountable and transparent ways, while also signaling that the purpose of the funds – enhanced development results - should not be ignored. The contribution to “norm formation” is that the forum includes not only countries adhering to the Busan Partnership, but also regional, international, and other organizations ranging from the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and World Bank, to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Global Environment Facility.\textsuperscript{31} This declaration is the first agreed framework for development cooperation among traditional donors, South-South donors, the BRICS, civil society, and private funders.

In the start of academic analysis of the impact of this change, South Korean academics Eun Mee Kim and Jae Eun Lee of Ewha Women’s University in Seoul call Busan a “shift towards a new global development cooperation paradigm.”\textsuperscript{32} They also elucidate some of the cleavages among various signatories to the Busan (or Global) Partnership; among the most important, the ‘voluntary participation’ and ‘differential commitments’ of the South-South partners on some provisions of the Busan Partnership that ensured their inclusion and endorsement yet at the cost of the integrity of the agreements contained within the document. This is a major source of criticism, i.e., that there were “too many political compromises to bring in the new actors.”\textsuperscript{33} At the same time, the authors consider that the inclusiveness of the HLF4 process and the endorsement by the diverse set of participants signifies a milestone in that this agreement will, for the first time, be more relevant for a greater percentage of global development cooperation activities undertaken by a more diverse set of actors who have already changed the dynamics of international development cooperation.\textsuperscript{34} This is a positive change, if there is a convergence or incorporation of the principles into the operating mandates of existing institutions in the international system.

In terms of the international system, the OECD DAC took another major step in 2007, when it endorsed a set of guidelines for principled engagement with fragile countries. These guidelines expanded on the reference to the needs of fragile countries in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The new \textit{Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations} established key standards for working with national reformers to build effective and legitimate state institutions. It also recognizes that while many countries are lagging in progress toward achievement of the MDGs, fragile countries have generally shown the least progress.


\textsuperscript{33} Kim and Lee, p. 796.

\textsuperscript{34} Kim and Lee, p. 793 and 799.
Among the *Principles* are both operating norms as well as values, most of which would seem self-evident for all development work (but were all violated in some degree in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste):

* Take context as the starting point
* Ensure all activities do no harm
* Recognize the links between political, security, and development objectives
* Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
* Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
* Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
* Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”)
* Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
* Focus on state-building as the central objective
* Prioritize prevention

For the broader development community, it is important to note that the 2008 Accra Agreement for Action (AAA) references both the Paris Declaration and the *Principles*. The AAA was endorsed by nearly 140 countries and nearly 30 international organizations, and therefore signifies broad consensus among the global community of actors working in and on behalf of fragile countries.

Importantly, the OECD is monitoring the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*. In the first report, issued in 2010, the *Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey: Global Report*\(^\text{35}\) includes a remarkably innovative set of self-assessments by six countries that agreed at the 2008 AAA to conduct in-country multi-stakeholder consultations. Both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste participated in this process and the outcomes reflect many of what I had identified as gaps from my experience. The crucial element of country’s political

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leadership is signaled by Timor-Leste’s self-assessment for the 2011 report, also based on multi-stakeholder consultations (Afghanistan did not conduct an assessment for this report).36

Three additional milestones will help to further address the particular challenges of countries affected by fragility and conflict. They also signify a critical shift in the “ownership” of decisions about development assistance to such countries.

One of the key milestones for fragile and conflict-affected countries is the formation of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), established in 2008 in Accra. It is another critical step in ensuring that the principles enshrined in the Principles will not only be adhered to in spirit but that the countries affected by conflict and fragility, alongside their international partners, can identify concrete steps that will contribute to their achievement. The IDPS was also formed with the realization that even well-meaning efforts to help countries transition out of the fragility and conflict affecting more than 1.5 billion people have had limited success, despite the fact that 30 percent of all official development assistance (ODA) is spent in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Currently, more than 40 countries, international organizations, and civil society organizations participate in the International Dialogue. This voluntary group’s secretariat is hosted by the OECD.

Building on the outcomes of other meetings, it has made further advances by identifying seven peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. The “Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” also identifies the challenges to achieving the goals, actions for effective support to both peacebuilding and statebuilding, and commits to development of an international action plan that specifically addresses the goals and challenges and targets four specific areas - capacity development, aid instruments, planning processes, and political dialogue (the action plan was to be delivered to the HLF4 in Busan). Importantly, endorsers also commit to feeding the results into other ongoing processes within the UN and OECD;37 this helps to ensure that

they are not stand-alone commitments that are less able to be monitored for compliance and improved adherence.

At the second conference of the International Dialogue, held June 2011 in Monrovia, Liberia, Dialogue members and members of the G7+ refined the goals to five.\(^{38}\) This was instrumental in the development of more concrete steps for changing the policy and practice of engagement with fragile countries in the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.”\(^{39}\) The New Deal represents broader consensus with endorsement not only by the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, but also the members of the G7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organizations. It is also a sign of greater ownership by countries and areas affected by conflict and fragility, marking further progress from the more usual donor-driven approach to development assistance. As a means of helping conflict and fragility affected countries to make better progress in achieving the MDGs, the New Deal focuses on five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs): legitimate politics, defined as inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; security, defined as establishing and strengthening people’s security; justice, addressing injustices and increasing people’s access to justice; economic foundations, creating employment and improving livelihoods; and revenues and services – both managing revenues and building capacity for accountable and fair delivery. The goals are supplemented by two vital cross-cutting themes:

- Trust:  this is a pre-condition for all of the New Deal’s commitments. The elements are transparent use of aid; risk-sharing; increased use of country systems (as opposed to parallel and off-budget support); building capacities in a more balanced manner; and more timely and predictable aid.

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Focus: this commits to more inclusive and country-led and country-owned paths from fragility (as opposed to donor-driven). Notably, as a means of proceeding, it identifies country-led fragility assessments – including a fragility spectrum – as the basis for decisions [which would address some key issues from my experience in Afghanistan]. It also sets out the commitment to “one vision, one plan” built on an inclusive country-led process that includes short-, medium-, and long-term peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. Compacts as a means to implementing the “one vision, one plan” are identified. It also commits to use of the PSGs to monitor progress (rather than another parallel set) and to support the development and capacity of credible and inclusive political dialogue and leadership among the country’s governmental and non-governmental institutions.

The New Deal was presented in Busan’s 2011 high-level forum by the International Dialogue and widely endorsed by the participants.

For the formal institutional structure of the OECD, a key step was the formation of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) in 2009. INCAF is a subsidiary body under the OECD DAC and works closely with the UN, NATO, the World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral organizations focusing on conflict and fragility; importantly, the INCAF consults with South-South aid providers. INCAF is responsible for monitoring international engagement with the more than 40 fragile and conflict-affected states and for working to improve international engagement in these countries. Taking a whole-of-government approach, it engages at the institutional level to: a) improve donor engagement to fragile states through the Principles; b) ensure more coherent responses by policymakers, staff, and affected countries in addressing insecurity, state fragility, and conflict and furthering progress toward peace and security; c) promote greater clarity on the resource flows to fragile states by focusing on finance and aid architecture; and d) support the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.  

Greater voice and clarity of needs from fragile countries:

There have been ongoing discussions about ensuring that development is accountable to the citizens it is intended to benefit. Most of these discussions have revolved around the reduction of poverty and increasing citizen involvement in already-set activities. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the number of people living in fragile countries either undergoing or emerging from conflict, estimated at 1.5 billion people and absorbing 30 percent of global ODA. A corollary recognition is that the subset of countries affected by conflict may have special challenges in achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were a positive in establishing a common framework for development and global poverty reduction, and yet also did not necessarily address the particular circumstances of the conflict countries more broadly.

The first decade of the 21st century marks a critical shift for international development, i.e., a gradual global process toward a more regularized and structured response to countries in these circumstances, as well as a more inclusive process. Starting with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which led in 2007 to the OECD’s endorsement of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, still primarily donor-led, the 2008 Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Ghana, opened up participation to more civil society groups as well as developing countries, and also established the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Notably, by 2010, the dialogue resulted in peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives emerging from a more inclusive set of participants including traditional and emerging donor countries, recipient “fragile/conflict” countries, international and regional institutions, and civil society.

A potentially seismic shift in development circles is the leadership exemplified in the formation of the G7+, a voluntary group comprised of now 20 countries. The purpose is to serve as a forum for discussion of common development challenges in conflict contexts but, more importantly, to recommend and advocate for international development policies that better meet their priority national strategic needs in governance, economic and social development, and

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security. Also crucially, these principles emerging from the 2010 meeting of the dialogue, in Dili, Timor-Leste, were detailed in specific peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (legitimate politics, security, economic foundations, justice, and revenue and services) that were enshrined in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and endorsed at the Fourth High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in 2011.42

What is notable in the further work of the G7+ is the self-definition of the “fragility spectrum” from crisis, to rebuild and reform, transition, transformation, and resilience,43 and the conflict assessments conducted by the countries themselves, as linked to national plans/priorities.

Other international shifts:

The changing international environment also affected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, specifically, in elaborating more fully on civil-military cooperation. In 2003, NATO issued a new Strategic Concept that recognized a broader scope of threats to international security and that might require NATO’s involvement and indeed, might require the Alliance to participate in conflict prevention, crisis management and crisis response operations.44 More importantly for this paper, it articulates key principles in coordinating and cooperating with international, national, NGOs, and other agencies that include the different stages of involvement, changing environment, and harmonizing of civilian and military objectives.45

In the last two decades, the US military has also made changes reflective of the new global environment. The most major change is the 2005 US Department of Defense (DOD) directive designating stability operations as core missions of the US military. After the experiences of the 1990s with the international interventions, there were vigorous debates revolved around the proper role of the military: broadly defined, the arguments were that the US military should not

42 Wyeth, pp. 7-9.
45 AJP-9, p. 1-1, 3-6, and 3-7. Note that the principles are further elaborated in AJP-3.4.9, NATO Standard, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, Edition A Version 1 (February 2013), NATO Standardization Agency.
be involved in peacekeeping operations, retaining its core competencies and capabilities for
defense of the nation, while others concluded that the US military needed to evolve to absorb
“stability operations” (functions beyond pure defense). September 2001 and other events
significantly changed the debate, with new focus on the US’s interests in ensuring global
stability.

Incorporating stability operations as a core US military mission, a fundamental change in
military doctrine, reinforced a cascading set of initiatives already underway. For instance, in
1993, the US Army established its Peacekeeping Institute that was later expanded, in 2003, to
include stability operations as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).46
Notably, the US Army issued Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, which details the
US Army’s involvement in a comprehensive approach integrating all elements of statecraft – the
military, civilian agencies, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private
sector. The military undertakes specific tasks in support of the US Department of State’s
coordination of stability operations, which include civilian security, justice and reconciliation,
humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance, and economic stabilization and
infrastructure. Depending on the circumstances, this may include simply restoration of services,
establishment of a safer environment for other actors to carry out governance or other activities,
or provision of services until civilian entities can assume control.47

The importance of this doctrinal change is highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta in his confirmation testimony in 2011: “Stability operations are a core U.S. military
mission which we should be prepared to conduct with a proficiency equivalent to combat
operations.”48 The institutional changes are then reflected in the issuance of a series of
publications by the Joint Chiefs of Staff detailing the governance of activities and performance

23, 2014).
2.5-2.12. This paper does not include the more controversial counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, though COIN
covers the same areas, i.e., civilian security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being,
governance, and economic stabilization and infrastructure, and the purpose/procedures under each area to achieve
the COIN goals and objectives. See Headquarters, US Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency,
48 PKSOI Mission Brief, ibid.
of the US Armed Forces in joint operations and the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and military involvement in multinational operations – e.g., *Stability Operations, Joint Publication* 3-07, specifying responsibilities in areas including security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation\(^{49}\) and *Peace Operations, Joint Publication* 3-07.3, elaborating on the scope of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building, and reflecting changes as other institutions revise their peacekeeping and peacekeeping-related policies and procedures.\(^{50}\)

A joint publication of the US Army’s PKSOI and the US Institute of Peace, issued in 2009, proposed practical, key considerations for “stabilization and reconstruction” initiatives that involve a diversity of actors, including not only US government agencies (DOS, DOD, USAID, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Justice), but also numerous UN agencies, government agencies of four European countries, and regional and international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. It is the only such document discovered during my research and sets out an important framework for work in conflict-affected areas. It identifies the cross-cutting principles of legitimacy, political primacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, host nation ownership and capacity, and regional engagement. The unity of effort cross-cutting principle includes critical underlying assumptions, which illustrate the immense challenges facing the international community: shared understanding of the situation (derived from various assessments of the violent conflict, from the USG’s whole of government assessment, the UN’s, and other governments’), shared strategic goal, integration, cooperation and coherence, civil-military cooperation, and recognition of humanitarian space.\(^{51}\) Unfortunately, it does not appear that there has been any further attention to ensuring that they are better implemented or represented within various institutions.

Within the US Government, there have been other important developments. Andrew Natsios, former Administrator of the USAID, sees an “increasing frequency of civil-military collaborations” and that the convergence in the ongoing development of the military’s

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\(^{49}\) Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations, Joint Publication* 3-07 (September 29, 2011).

\(^{50}\) Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Peace Operations, Joint Publication* 3-07.3 (August 1, 2012).

stabilization operations and reconstruction/development.\textsuperscript{52} The same year, 2005, USAID published its “Fragile States Strategy” that sets out a new vision for strengthening fragile states; it correlates to the 2004 establishment of the US Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (as of 2012, the Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)).\textsuperscript{53} Later, after the OECD issued its \textit{Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States}, the USG formed the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) that included the US Department of State, USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Forces Command, and the PKSOI (2008).

\textbf{Changes in the international development sector}

\textit{Dramatic growth in the kinds and numbers of actors}

During the period of my resident work in Asia starting in 1992, there has been dramatic growth in the kinds and numbers of actors implementing development assistance programs in the area of democracy and governance, with a proliferation in non-governmental organizations (NGOs); expanded mandate of traditional relief organizations into broader-based development organizations encompassing democracy and governance (executive branch, parliaments, rule of law, civil society, counter-corruption, human rights, policy development and implementation, women’s rights, elections, etc.); transnational advocacy networks; private organizations; private sector firms; multiplicity of international and multilateral organizations; and, in the case of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, military or peacekeeping entities. In the case of the latter, there are many different country’s militaries or peacekeepers contributing to the missions, with countries’ possibly reflecting differing approaches or rationales in their work in these areas. From civilian perspective, there is expectation of “unity of command” and “unity of effort” from the “military” but the different services, branches, and national militaries are not a single entity.

Additionally, the development field has evolved into the “development industry,” beyond the more grass-roots efforts of the earlier years.

_Monetization and/or corporatization of the development industry_

Although altruism and idealism are still present in the international development field, the reality is that it has become a global business. The maturation of the development industry means that the “genie is out of the bottle” and the funding available will continue to attract a growing number and type of organizations. Another emerging development is the donor attempt to reduce management costs that will lead to larger and fewer contracts with recipient organizations, thus also acting as a draw for a more diverse set of implementing organizations.

There is a multiplicity of reasons for the increase in number of actors involved in development, an outgrowth of changes starting in the 20th century with both political openings to spread “democracy” and human rights, new normative values for democracies that require flourishing civil societies in order to thrive as “real democracies”, and the outsourcing of more development assistance to NGOs. This corresponds as well with what Kim Reimann identifies as the expansion of responsibilities of international institutions and regimes’ responsibilities for new global challenges, which led to analysis of how best to accomplish this without expansion of the international institutions themselves.54 The author also highlights the concurrent development of international institutions’ evolving belief in the need for broad participation in their agenda setting and policy-making, which also promoted attention to the establishment and advancement of civil society in both developing and newly democratic countries, which fed into the growth of NGOs.55

The “new pro-NGO norm” that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s was underpinned by the belief that NGOs “…were the voice of the people and vehicles of private initiative… and depicted NGOs as a crucial ‘partner’ in development as well as an enforcer of good governance whose very existence was required as evidence that a state was democratic, accountable, and in

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55 Reimann, p. 48.
some way open to the participation of citizens.” Ideologically, the new assumption for being a “properly functioning free market and democratic nation in the 1990s and 2000s, it was now necessary to have a flourishing ‘civil society’ sector that included NGOs and other citizen-oriented groups” and replaced a model of state-led development that had been the vogue for two decades. With more funding going to democracy aid in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, a broader set of NGOs was brought into the development circle, i.e., a continuation of work with service NGOs but inclusion of politically active advocacy NGOs.

This has correspondingly led to the rise of ‘political globalization’ in which there is a “symbiotic relationship of mutual growth and interdependence among states, IGOs and NGOs.” There may also be the expectation that NGOs are able to perform functions that states are unable or unwilling to carry out due to either budget, personnel, or avoidance of the consequences.

The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opening of Eastern Europe, and the major international interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia were a transformative period for involvement of NGOs in development and governance work. As Alexander Cooley and James Ron describe this new world, the promise of the new more robust transnational civil society, a good in and of itself, with the new demands arising from the time period, led to what they characterize as organizational insecurity in their political economy of transnational action. The scholarship of this period coincides with the start of my involvement in international development, with influential writers such as Jessica Mathews arguing that the rising number of transnational NGOs is a trend that “deepens global democracy by ‘disrupt[ing] hierarchies’ and spreading ‘power among more people and groups,’ thereby promoting an unprecedented ‘power shift’ from states to … private organizations.”

56 Reimann, p. 59.
57 Reimann, p. 59.
59 Riemann, p. 63
61 Cooley/Ron, p. 9.
This normative belief is paralleled with the efforts to channel more government development funding through NGOs. The trend line in what Cooley and Ron refer to as “increasing organizational density” is clear from their descriptions of the numbers of NGOs working in or within conflict zones from 1980 to 1996: in 1980, about 37 foreign relief agencies worked in a key Cambodian refugee camp along the Thai border; by 1995, more than 200 international NGOs worked in Goma for Rwandan refugees; and in 1996, 240 international NGOs worked in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{62} At the time of the authors’ research, professional aid officials saw this as an “indication of the relief market’s low barriers to entry.”\textsuperscript{63} Further, they see that the “inter-organizational discord is a predictable outcome of existing material incentives.”\textsuperscript{64} The new density of actors competing for limited donor dollars, with shorter time durations and more competitive tenders, with limited barriers to entry for organizations, spawned some unintended institutional consequences that are yet to be completely understood, are not necessarily well-managed, let alone resolved.

With respect to these changes, scholars in the 1990s noted the “importance of transnational networks and organizations for global politics… [but the authors note that] now we should turn our attention to the material incentives shaping their actions.”\textsuperscript{65} One key reason is that although international NGOs may still be motivated by normative agendas, the new insecurity and competition for institutional survival create motivations to act in more rational ways that mimic the private sector where growth and profit are the operating rationales.\textsuperscript{66}

While their argument rests heavily on the attempts by NGOs to wrestle with the differences between the new material pressures and normative motivations, and that these may produce outcomes that not necessarily in keeping with liberal expectations. The authors published their article at the very start of the Afghanistan chapter and now, as its end approaches and there is the additional experience of Timor-Leste, it seems appropriate to recommend a political economy analysis of governance-building now that a quarter-century of major state-building efforts have

\textsuperscript{63} Cooley/Ron, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Cooley/Ron, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{65} Cooley/Ron, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{66} Cooley/Ron, p. 36.
taken place with the high level of involvement of non-state actors whose mandates do not necessarily include normative values as their primary considerations. This analysis should be comparative, enabling key stakeholders and leaders of the development/political/military/donor complex to verify if there are regional or other differences related to the “different conflicts creat[ing] different types of humanitarian markets, and that different markets will lead to variations in organizational behavior.”

Additionally, with the push in the 1990s for more accountable development assistance for governance, there was attention to the business models of the private sector to achieve better results. This led to an increase in the number of private sector firms entering the development field as well, and altered the expectations and operating frameworks for the development field.

In the case of Afghanistan, the military emerged as a major player in the delivery of development and governance-related initiatives. For the US alone, not including all countries contributing to governance/development funding, and inclusive of all USG funding (through Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID, etc.), the funding appropriations in 2002-2007 were about 6 billion, increasing reaching over 10 billion in 2009, nearly 20 billion in 2011, about 22 billion in 2012, and over 25 billion in 2014. Of these amounts, the breakdown of Department of Defense and other US government agency figures for governance/democracy are as follows:

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67 Cooley/Ron, p. 37.
The debate about the mix of defense, diplomacy, and development strategies for achievement of foreign policy objectives is not a new subject, as described in a paper published by Harvard University’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations. However, the paper argues that “increasingly the lines between them [defense, diplomacy, and development] are being blurred.” This is within a trajectory toward increased politicization of foreign aid overall. More broadly for Afghanistan, the trend line is shown in that the share of U.S. ODA going through the Pentagon rose from about 6 percent to nearly 22 percent (about $5.5 billion) between the years of 2002 and 2005. In Afghanistan, most of the ODA provided by the U.S. Department of Defense has been allocated to the military through mechanisms like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

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69 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan Reconstruction Fiscal Year 2013, Washington DC: Joint Strategic Planning Sub-Group for Oversight of Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 2012, p. 44. The acronyms in this chart include:
- CERP: Commander’s Emergency Response Program
- AIF: Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
- TFBSO: Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
- AFSA: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
- ESF: Economic Support Funds
- DA: Development Assistance
- CSH/GHAI: Child Survival & Health
- CCC: Commodity Credit Corp
- PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team


(PRTs) and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP). In Afghanistan, the on-the-ground reality was that there were many areas too insecure for more traditional development/governance actors to operate; secondly, it reflected a broad shift in military strategy that focused on “winning hearts and minds” as part of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

In the case of Afghanistan, while the presence of the diversity and sheer number of more traditional development actors was complicated enough, with differences in organizational mandate, etc., the entry of the military with a major presence in delivery of governance initiatives, with a dramatically different operating style and ethos, escalated the issues of coordination, unity of effort, reducing the extent of unintended consequences, and simple sharing of information that would have led to more effective outcomes in a longer-term effort.

This is a perennial issue, even within the US Government, in coordinating to a sufficient degree to achieve a higher unity of effort. The scope and range of activities and initiatives funded in Afghanistan is immense, of which governance/development is a large part but still swamped by the level of funds going to security. At the same time, the strategic issue identified in the joint Strategic Oversight Plan Afghanistan Reconstruction focuses on the need for interagency planning within the US Government entities devoting budgetary resources to Afghanistan (as recommended in a 2011 Senate staff report).

The challenges for the US Government, within its own set of agencies, at the agency level, let alone at the local levels, were magnified for the efforts of the militaries of all participating NATO countries in Afghanistan. They were accentuated due to the presence of different country

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72 Stewart Patrick and Paysie Brown, “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role – Working Paper 131.” Washington DC: Center for Global Development, November 12, 2007, p. 2 (http://www.cgdev.org/publication/pentagon-and-global-development-making-sense-dods-expanding-role, accessed June 5, 2014). For the purposes of this paper, the concerns about the future relate to the assumption that militaries (including the US military) will continue to be deployed to insecure zones due to the forecasts in persistent intrastate conflict, and that there will continue to be the expectation for assistance in development/governance that will perpetuate the use of military forces for non-defense related activities. This paper recommends that DoD aid roles outside of Iraq and Afghanistan not be pursued though it identifies recommendations for the U.S. Government in ensuring more effective cooperation between civilian agencies such as the US Department of State and USAID with the DoD in instances where DoD-led counter-terrorism, capacity building, and post-conflict activities are pursued.

73 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan Reconstruction Fiscal Year 2013, p. 36, referring to: Senate Majority Staff Report-Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 8, 2011.
forces within NATO, responsible for different provinces, with potentially different approaches among the military *writ large*. Simply put, with the diverse and numerous civilian actors on the ground and particularly due to having a diverse set of military actors involved (i.e., member nations of NATO), there is a need for attention to how to accomplish “unity of effort” on both the strategic and tactical levels for civilian and military actors without creating numerous and complex new reporting, knowledge sharing, and coordination frameworks that would only increase time and resource pressures on the actors in an already stressful and complex situation.

For Afghanistan, the major differences between the PRTs encompass “variations in approach, budgetary resources, and character” with highlights from case studies in five provinces, three in the south and east (Helmand, Paktia, and Uruzgan) and two in the north (Balkh and Faryab). A Finnish advisor for Security and Development, Political Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Oskari Eronen, shows this in starker terms with charts detailing the differences in rationale, financial flows, size, balance between civilian and military staff, leadership, as well as the diversity and methods used for the security, governance, and reconstruction activities undertaken by the PRTs. Even within what was well-intended, the operational characteristics led to an “imbalanced network of provincial units, whose performance in governance and development is not controlled by ISAF” as NATO had command only over the security/military elements of the PRTs. Further, due to each nation’s command of various PRTs, there were other differences in the lead country’s “policies, traditions and bureaucracies” that impacted what were intended to be responsive and flexible units.

Another element of this fragmentation is the command structure. Formally, the agreed-upon command structure for each PRT was to the ISAF regional command. However, as noted in personal discussions with US military officers who worked in an Afghanistan PRT, and in a

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76 Eronen, p. 25.

publication by US military officer in ISAF’s Regional Command South, actual reporting was to the command hierarchy in the relevant country’s military.78

The differences between the purpose, focus, and approaches of the PRTs vividly capture the fundamental debates about change in Afghanistan, and highlight reasons why coordination and the “unity of effort” between all actors working on governance/development was so challenging – the internal coordination and “unity of effort” within each military entity was fragmented and diverse, let alone between civilian and military entities. Unfortunately, some of the differences created perverse incentives that led to vicious cycles or unintended consequences in a variety of areas.79

Lack of analysis

With many compelling goals and objectives, there was also a lack of analysis writ large. This is reflected in an inadequate understanding of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste as distinctive countries, as well as of the impact of foreign assistance, overall and for governance in particular. This gap pertains to the culture, history, the political economy of the country, with its formal and informal institutions, leaders, and processes, power alliances, etc., as well as a political economy analysis of the conflict and variations by region and province, and diverse and complex nature of drivers of conflict. For Afghanistan, Fishstein and Wilder note that the political and economic competition for resources and power may have roots in ethnic, tribal, and factional relationships80. Particular to the circumstances of international intervention, when higher funding levels may be provided, there is also the “political economy of aid.” In a conflict setting, the consequences of poor understanding or awareness of “local conflict dynamics, the impact of the war-aid economy on these dynamics, the perceived winners and losers of aid programs, and the role of these programs in legitimizing (or delegitimizing) the government.”81

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79 See Fishstein/Wilder.
80 Fishstein/Wilder, p. 3.
81 Fishstein/Wilder, p. 5.
For Afghanistan, some argue that international support to the Government of Afghanistan cemented an already-existing political system of patronage, rather than a more mature, rules-based system. Likewise, in Timor-Leste, after the upheaval in violence in 2006, there was an acknowledgement that the failure to predict any upsurge of conflict (and in fact, at the end of the “final” UN peacekeeping mandate in Timor-Leste) was due to inadequate analysis.

Without this analysis, it will therefore be difficult if not impossible to forecast the outcomes of aid, especially higher levels, if there is lack of understanding of the institutional incentives involved. Therefore, it is recommended to “give more attention to understanding the incentive structures of national and international civilian and military institutions in terms of aid delivery, and the impact of these incentive structures on the effective delivery of development assistance.”

Entry of new donors

One other feature of the change in the international system for foreign assistance is the entry of other powers as donors, alongside the dynamic growth of private philanthropy from foundations. The “traditional” donors, which operate under the OECD DAC, with “emerging” donors from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The dollar contributions of non-traditional donors outside of the post-World War II framework of the OECD DAC have substantially increased. There are fundamental differences in the philosophy and operating styles of the emerging donors, characterized by one study from the Center for Global Development (CGD) as the DAC model, the Arab model, and the Southern model. Aside from more practical difficulties in tracking...

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83 Fishstein/Wilder, p. 5.
84 This paper does not focus on the broad field of international philanthropy and remittances. Beyond the role of key philanthropic organizations like the Gates Foundation that has begun reporting to the OECD DAC, the paper primarily focuses on government-to-government development assistance. For background on international philanthropy, see The Center for Global Prosperity, Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2013. Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2013.
levels and effectiveness of foreign assistance going to development and governance, due to the increasing funding from emerging donors, there is a growing challenge of coordination among a growing and more diverse set of actors. There appears to be a lack of convergence among the models with the longest-existing international framework for development assistance, the OECD/DAC’s, with its standardized reporting (although gradually more non-DAC countries are reporting to the OECD/DAC). The participation of emerging donors in international fora such as the OECD’s gatherings on aid/development effectiveness, is a step in the right direction in order to reach broader international consensus on the new norms for aid.

The CGD’s working paper notes the variations among DAC donors in terms of “aid levels, modalities, and characteristics” but that they do share agreement in principle on the “same standards, … largely … the same concepts of what qualifies as development assistance, and … are increasingly willing to partner with each other.” The fact that a number of the emerging donors have ascribed to the OECD DAC reporting standards and a number are adhering to the OECD’s agreements on aid/development effectiveness marks significant progress in aiming toward a new more unified and consolidated international system for official development assistance. In the context of Asia, further attention to ensuring the participation of rising major donors, Brazil, India, and the People’s Republic of China, is critical (for this paper, it should be noted that Brazil gives chiefly to Portuguese speaking countries and is therefore relevant to Timor-Leste; India assists Afghanistan; and China assists both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste).

As the CGD working paper also notes, there are distinctive differences in the “fundamental philosophies and intentions” between the three models of development assistance. The different purposes may not be as critical an issue in countries undergoing international intervention as whether the differences create conflicting agendas or are counter-productive at a working level unless there is a way to ensure exactly what is being done for the country under the overarching international agreement governing the international (development/military/peacekeeping)

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86 Of note, however, is that many of the non-DAC donors do report to the OECD DAC. This includes Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, but not the People’s Republic of China and India, which are the highest-ranking Asian emerging donors. Please see: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Development Assistance Committee, Multilateral Aid Report, 2012, pp. 21-22.
87 Walz/Ramachandran, CDG working paper, pp. 8-9.
88 Walz/Ramachandran, CDG working paper, p. 9.
intervention. Although it is clear that some of the differences may create contradictory incentives within the country – e.g., Southern donors do not usually have conditionality in their aid whereas DAC donors do often require conditionalities such as changes to governance or financial policies. At a tactical, operational level, this will create a more complex set of challenges making a good-faith effort to ensure complementarity, non-duplication, leveraging, and avoiding unfair pressure on the recipient institutions and organizations.

While Asian Southern donors (e.g., China and India) may not participate actively in “traditional donor coordination mechanisms”, they are active participants in a wide array of regional or substantively focused fora – e.g., BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa], ASEAN Plus 3 [China, Japan, and Korea], etc. And, since they are actively participating in government-to-government meetings with the recipient countries (e.g., India – Afghanistan), they could also be open to meetings convened by the UN that could achieve some of the same working principles.

Further, given the emerging greater role of militaries and peacekeepers as implementers of development/governance activities, the absence of military and peacekeeping participants in the OECD’s high-level forums for aid/development effectiveness is notable.

**Why these questions matter** for delivery of governance-related foreign assistance in cases of international intervention, a forecast of trends and issues:

a) **Levels of accountability**: during international intervention, the levels of accountability increase. Not only must recipients meet the requirements of each individual donor, which, for public donors, is accountable to its host country’s legislature and executive; they must also meet the overarching requirements of the international agreements to which a multitude of governments are signatory or take the form of UN Security Council resolutions. Donor stewardship is therefore more complex in cases of international intervention and responding to the various constituencies absorbs more time by all actors and may also introduce some

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unanticipated conflicts between host country needs and interests and those of the international bodies.

b) **Intrastate civil strife** is predicted to persist over time, so attention to democracy and governance in countries where these institutions and processes are weakened, will only increase over time. The countries where intrastate conflict will continue to exist are those with persistent youth bulges and rapidly growing populations. As noted in the two most recent global trends reports of the National Intelligence Council (2025, issued in 2008, and 2030, issued in 2012), while the number of countries in this category will decrease during the next 10-15 years, they will also grow more concentrated in certain regions. Additionally, while some countries in this “arc of instability” will have maturing populations of youth under the median age of 25, the 2030 report notes that there are three instances where intrastate conflicts are gradually increasing: 1) “…countries with a mature overall population that contain a politically dissonant, youthful ethnic minority”; 2) countries with a “…large number of ethnic and tribal minorities that will remain more youthful than the overall population;” and 3) countries with rising levels of natural resource depletion (e.g., water) with simultaneously “disproportionate levels of young men.”

Any increases coincide with changes in the character of intrastate conflict, which, while it is chiefly conducted by irregular warfare (terrorism, subversion, sabotage, insurgency, and criminal activity), there may also be an increase in use of precision weapons such as missiles where the intrastate conflict will approach the more traditional forms of warfare.

The 2030 global trends report speculates that the shorter duration of instances of intrastate conflict since the 1990s coincides with support for peace support operations (PSOs); in fact, the “proportion of youthful countries experiencing one or more violent intrastate conflicts declined from 25 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2004.” Therefore, to the extent that

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93. 2030, p 60.
94. 2030, p 59.
intrastate conflict declines, except in countries which exhibit the characteristics described above, the prerequisite appears to be the involvement of PSOs as well as efforts regarding nation-building.\textsuperscript{95} Decreased global support for PSOs alone could be a game-changer with respect to the levels of intrastate conflicts.\textsuperscript{96}

c) Military / peacekeeper involvement in development/governance: Although there is a lively debate about the level of future involvement of militaries in “development” or “governance” activities and programs, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, given imperatives of expectations of the global community and citizens of the affected countries, it seems likely that there will continue to be involvement which leads to the need for attention at modalities of collaboration and cooperation among the principle major international, political, and military institutions.

Some conflict experts such as Johanna Mendelson Forman and Liora Danan writing for the journal issued by the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, specifically address the likelihood of continued stabilization and reconstruction operations in what they call the “third generation of conflict.”\textsuperscript{97} In the military, there is divided opinion but consensus of key military informants is that there will continue to be involvement. On one hand, the reduction of military budgets could argue for focus on the core tasks of the military (ensuring security); on the other hand, in the US, one argument for avoiding force and budget loss is to expand the role of security to more governance and development activities (mission creep).

The similar dilemmas for peacekeepers are raised for Timor-Leste, as part of the growing trend toward what authors Pushkina and Maier refer to as ‘multifunctional peacekeeping missions.’\textsuperscript{98} The acute dilemmas for the UN and its expansion from strictly (security) peacekeeping to the peacebuilding that incorporates elements of development and

\textsuperscript{95} 2030, p 59.
\textsuperscript{96} 2030, p 61.
governance, are well-described in an article about the UN in Timor-Leste. Written by a former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Ian Martin, and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, it discusses the initial UN mission – the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the particular challenges faced by the Transitional Administrator and Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello. It has specific recommendations for the UN in its handling of these multi-faceted peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.99

d) **Clearer and higher levels of expectations for “governance,”** i.e., efficient and regular government delivery of public services, high levels of citizen engagement, broad inclusion, fairness, accountability, pluralism, and a secure and stable environment. That is, not only expectations of what concrete benefits an accountable, efficient, effective, and legitimate government will deliver for its citizens but how the government performs and carries out its functions. Over my years in international development, there has been a global normative shift, with these governance expectations becoming an essential “public good” that is now demanded by more of the world’s citizens, irrespective of the level of development and state of stability. This has been driven and fueled by availability of the internet, growth of civil society and emergence of transnational advocacy networks, increased global mobility of labor and capital, and in many regions, a shift to a much younger demographic with sometimes volatile results.

e) **Implications:** These trends have major implications for donors and recipient countries, most particularly for those countries facing international intervention that have overarching agreements between the host country and the international community (e.g., Bonn Agreement, ratified by the United Nations Security Council, and the Timor-Leste UN peacekeeping and political agreements through UN Security Council resolutions), as there are higher-level goals and objectives beyond any individual bilateral agreements that may supplement or be subsumed under the overarching agreements with the international community. Depending on the political circumstances of the overarching agreements, this may create a more

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complicated set of factors regarding the donors’ ability to respond to the citizens’ expectations, than would exist in other countries, even those “transition” countries like Mongolia following the democratic transition or Indonesia after the fall of Suharto and the launch of the massive decentralization program.

How to ensure that the goals and objectives of foreign assistance for governance are still met, in the context of this new operating environment, is critical.

**Terminology issues:**

Underlying this research study is the challenge of terminology in all literatures – academic, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and military – with other differences internationally and nationally. Different terms may be used to appeal to different constituencies and avoid political pitfalls, or more commonly, have historically embedded meanings. In addressing the complexity of the 21st century, the challenge of terminology not only complicates analysis but also creates both known and hidden obstacles to a “unity of effort.” Particularly in cases of international intervention, where there are diverse actors carrying a multiplicity of actions, the obstacles of terminology themselves may have unintended consequences. Further, a lack of clarity on the underlying assumptions of the terminology will create difficulties in achieving goals and objectives because of the lack of shared understanding of what constitutes even the agreed-upon language. It is crucial to understand the implicit as well as explicit meanings of the terminology; for practitioners, the differences have operational consequences; for academics, there is more profound significance. Examples of debates over terminology include:

* Peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction: a 2006 Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress describes some of these challenges in the context of US military involvement. The rationale for use of specific terms, whether peacekeeping, peace operations, stabilization, or stabilization, are set out along with the evolution in use of this terminology. For the US, much of the debate has evolved most recently due to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, flowing out of earlier involvement in Somalia and the
Balkans. It also captures the political dilemmas of whether the US should do “nation-building” or “state-building”, in what context, and what it actually encompasses.¹⁰⁰

* Fragility: the array of descriptors is well described in a speech by a senior official of the International Crisis Group. For fragile states, they range from ‘weak,’ ‘failing,’ ‘failed,’ to ‘collapsed,’ ‘at risk,’ ‘precarious,’ ‘vulnerable,’ and ‘recovering.’¹⁰¹ Along with this array, the official points to the criticism of scholars in the term being “pejorative and analytically imprecise;” rather, the literature indicates that fragility exists along a continuum and is “highly context-specific and comes in a variety of economic, political, and social forms.” Although he concludes that a good working definition is the World Bank’s and that fragile states “share a common fragility, in two particular respects: State policies and institutions are weak in these countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. They face risks of conflict and political instability.”¹⁰² Yet this still leaves out the crucial question of causation among state of development, political culture, and security. And state fragility may also encompass a continuum of conflict, post-conflict, humanitarian crisis, or chronically poor, and does not necessarily capture where the country is in this spectrum (becoming more fragile or improving and therefore demonstrating “resilience”).¹⁰³

* Governance: as noted above, my working definition is taken from Thomas Weiss’s seminal publication, Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?: a “…composite system of [formal and informal] authoritative values, rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies,

¹⁰² Grono, ibid.
and organizations through which an entity manages… its common affairs.”

And to clarify on the meaning of “managing,” the World Bank’s definition of governance refers to both decision-making and to authority, i.e., how decisions are made and how authority is exercised.

In this paper, based on how governance was used in my work in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, it assumes pluralism, participation, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, and equitable provision of public services.

**Discussion**

The particulars of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste are symptomatic of underlying issues in the international system, with the surge of multi-dimensional international interventions to deal with states experiencing serious levels of violent conflict. At the same time as the arguments about “failed states”, “fragile states,” etc., rages on, institutions have had to make immediate responses. While there has been some institutional restructuring or re-orienting to deal with the new multi-faceted realities, among them: the UN’s creation of the Peacekeeping Office and its independent study on integrated missions, the US Department of State’s creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 – though not staffed until 2008 [as of 2012, now the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)], OECD’s establishment of its *Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* in 2007, and NATO’s involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, all beyond its stated scope of mission. Roland Paris notes the significance of the rare instance of a concept travelling from the periphery of scholarship and policymaking so quickly. Not surprisingly, both by lack of understanding of the cascading set of violent internal conflicts that are judged serious enough to warrant international or regional intervention, and lack of agreement on causation, etc., along with different institutional mandates due to bureaucracy,

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104 Weiss, p. 31.

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approaches, etc., leading to an on-the-ground confusion of development, reconstruction, stabilization, and/or state-building, with sometimes conflicting incentives (both with respect to participating international institutions as well as to internal dynamics of the country undergoing international intervention).

With the circumstances described in this paper, at the end of the Afghanistan and Timor-Leste efforts, and diverse and expanding instances of international intervention over the last two decades, it would be wise to have a comprehensive and inclusive meeting of political, military, development, and donor (traditional and non-traditional) institutions, and agencies to identify the main lessons learned from the last two decades of international interventions. More importantly, the meeting (or meetings) would make recommendations for the design of a framework for managing the complex dynamics of the 21st century world. Authors Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk make the case for managing rather than resolving the dilemmas emerging from the challenges of coordination, security, political economy, institutional design, and autonomy, and calls for insertion of “dilemma analyses” as a critical step in handling the in-built contradictions.109

While that is a positive step for all participating institutions in an intervention, given that any one intervention is likely to have particular circumstances, there is a need for more inclusive, non-siloed attention to design of a commonly understood international framework for international interventions, with the most commonly experienced features. This is a critical prerequisite for identification of ways to ensure sustainable and effective attention to those states undergoing international intervention, with the recognition that the states will likely require ongoing attention to its institutions and development long after the formal international intervention has ended. Likewise, it is an opportune time for more comparative attention by scholars who can address the interventions in an interdisciplinary manner that recognizes the growing complexity of the global community with more interdependence and fragmentation, and of the contexts of the interventions themselves.

How do you make it work, to avoid chaos? What is “it”? And what is the right question?

With the new realities that intrastate conflict will continue to persist, that international organizations will continue to judge that involvement is necessary in order to preserve stability (or to avoid further destabilization), that there will continue to be a diverse multiplicity of organizations involved, and that citizens will continue to expect “governance” as a new global good (simultaneous with reduction of conflict), the question of how to create more effective approaches to resolution is a complicated one. While the complexity will remain, the international community has taken many steps to adjust to the new realities of more fragile and conflict-prone countries that threaten global security and face serious developmental challenges, the question remains about how to make further progress.

In this respect, one of the problems may be that the conceptual approach has been inadequate in two respects: the first is approaching work in fragile/conflict-prone countries undergoing intervention as ‘tame’ rather than ‘wicked’ problems; the second is having the expectation that the issues about how to approach these complex situations with a diversity of actors can be resolved rather than seeing that these dilemmas need to be better acknowledged and managed.

A corollary about better managing the diversity of actors, and reality of hierarchical civilian and military management structures, regional/international authority/command structures (e.g., NATO and UN), and transnational NGO networks, is the prospect of using network analysis to suggest more effective ways to coordinate, share information, avoid duplication, and leverage the resource contributions from the many actors to achieve more effective and sustainable outcomes. Conducting “network mapping” will be context-specific and suggest different approaches for particular instances of international intervention. This approach does not suggest that organizations and institutions can or should stop working on more effective interagency coordination and communication, only that network analysis may yield practical, informal, and short-term solutions for the actors on the ground at any one time. It may yield some sound findings that will be helpful in determining a more optimal balance between traditional, hierarchical governance structures and new network governance – and if it is applicable at one or more levels (strategically, nationally, locally, operationally, etc.).
Network analysis has been used most recently in probing terrorist networks. There is a richer literature focused on the corporate world over the last decade or two, which could be applied in expanding this area of academic research for topics related to governance, development and international interventions, and delving further into performance and accountability issues, among others.\(^{110}\)

A corollary of wicked problems is that indicators might need to be changed due to recognition that solutions are time-bound and not reflective of the dynamic nature of wicked problems.

**Wicked and tame problems**

Tame problems are those with well-defined and unchanging problem statements; a well-defined end point; a solution that can be evaluated as right or wrong; and a limited set of other possible solutions. Wicked problems are difficult to define clearly; are multi-causal and have many inter-dependencies; are socially complex and therefore have no true or false solutions because they are evaluated in a context where different stakeholders have different goals and values; have solutions that are unique because the problems are so multi-dimensional; require trying solutions to learn about the problem; may trigger unintended consequences because of the multi-causal nature of the problem; and every wicked problem is a symptom of another one.\(^{111}\) Menkhaus suggests that wicked problems for state fragility mainly revolve around the issue of political willingness to address fragility (i.e., that political leaders willing but not able to address the fragility have ‘tame problems’ while those leaders unwilling to address the fragility have ‘wicked problems.’) He then sets out typologies of state failure, ranging from degree of failure, type, and threat potential, to state willingness and capacity.\(^ {112}\)


\(^{112}\) Menkhaus, p. 89.
However, while a constructive approach to disentangling “fragility,” practical experience on the ground indicates that while political leadership is a key variable each of the typologies of state failure has a full range of ‘wicked problem’ elements. Fukuyama’s seminal *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* sets out the interdisciplinary nature of institution-building in state-building, where he identifies the elements of “state-ness” as including organizational design and management (from the disciplines of management, public administration, and economics); institutional design (political science, economics, and law); basis of legitimization (political science); and social and cultural factors (sociology and anthropology). And indeed, the latter are a result of leadership, education, and interactions with other societies as forged over time.\(^\text{113}\) As a result, approaching these wicked problems from a complex systems perspective may be beneficial and more advantageous.\(^\text{114}\)

*Complex adaptive systems*

Much of the literature today looks at making existing frameworks more effective, through more indicators, more cooperation, increased mechanisms for accountability, etc. However, a closer look at the multi-faceted set of global changes now underway, along with the increase of international intervention in fragile or post-conflict countries and the existence of “more is better” mentalities with set hierarchies of authority, is no longer sufficient to address the challenges of problem-solving with the dynamic increase in number and type of actors, increased layers of institutional accountabilities and bureaucracies, and a rise in global inter-connectiveness and interdependence. In contrast, using a different conceptual framework for approaching the 21\(^\text{st}\) century’s challenges that are more typically “wicked problems,” might promote more productive solutions and progress toward a new set of shared operating norms.

One of these conceptual models is “complex adaptive systems”, applying an interdisciplinary approach pioneered in the sciences to the new realities facing the international system. The complex adaptive systems approach offers insights about how to respond in a world with more dynamic, complex, diverse, and unpredictable developments, when the chosen solutions may


\(^{114}\) Ramalingam, ibid.
themselves have cascading impacts that leads to the need for further recalibration. This is an
goal of chaos theory, lying between mathematics and physics, in which the complex
systems are in a constant state of flux – with a series of regular, small occurrences, which may at
times lead to disaster, each new equilibrium as part of the dynamic process of change. These
dynamic transitions can trend toward either “chaos” or “stability” but are never completely static.
In the 1990s, career US Foreign Service Officer, Steven Mann, applied this to consideration of
national strategy. On the 50th anniversary of the “birth” of chaos theory, Foreign Policy
summarized key international relations and political science theorists’ thinking on its
applicability to these fields.

In recent years, this new thinking in the sub-field of complexity theory or complex systems has
been further explored in greater breadth by diverse entities and individuals from various sectors,
including academia, development, and military/security. Among the most influential for this
paper:

- William Frej (retired USAID senior official) and Ben Ramalingam (researcher with
honorary appointments at the London School of Economics, Sussex University’s Institute
of Development Studies, and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) analyze the new
operating environment in a 2011 Working Paper emerging from a conference at the Santa
Fe Institute in 2011.
- Ben Ramalingam makes the case for this approach in the development and humanitarian
fields in his new publication, Aid on the Edge of Chaos (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013) and a ODI Working Paper: “Exploring the Science of Complexity: Ideas and

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116 Joshua E. Keating, “Can Chaos Theory Teach Us Anything about International Relations,” War of Ideas blog,
Foreign Policy, May 23, 2013.
http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/23/can_chaos_theory_teach_us_anything_about... Accessed October 2,
2013.
Implications for Development and Humanitarian Efforts,” *ODI Working Paper 285* (October 2008), with co-authors Harry Jones, Toussaint Reba, and John Young.\(^{118}\)

- Using the pseudonym “Mr. Y,” active-duty military officers Colonel Mark Mykleby, US Marine Corps, and Captain Wayne Porter, US Navy, conducted a study of systems and applicability to new security perspectives for the U.S., identifying what they call a ‘strategic ecosystem’ that requires attention to “open, dynamic systems” with more emergent trends rather than on closed systems of specific threats, risks, and nations or organizations.\(^{119}\)

However, the work to date has focused primarily on development and humanitarian assistance, and not necessarily cases of international intervention with an overarching international agreement that spans security, development, and diplomacy. Both these applied works and the other literature on “complex adaptive systems” suggest a radically different starting set of assumptions in cases of international intervention which are, by their nature, usually in “fragile” or “weak” states. They are helpful in providing ideas for thinking about how to adjust or transform at the strategic and operational / tactical levels, in a dynamic, ever-changing system. They are important to understand, as they will determine if the international system and its component parts will do new things in old ways or have a transformation into a new system with new, related norms and customs, i.e., a new paradigm. Key attributes are:

- Interconnectivity and interdependence of all elements and dimensions/levels (can be loose or tight, with more or less levels)
- Feedback processes cause and stop change within systems
- System characteristics and behaviors emerge from all interactions (important for weak or unformed systems, which are more impacted than more developed systems)
- Nonlinearity


- Sensitivity to starting conditions (change unfolds based on history and socio-economic characteristics)(and where you start has implications for what change is seen)
- Phase space (patterns of key characteristics); what is unchanged and what is changeable
- Attractors (equilibrium or chaos, and the “edge of chaos”)
- Adaptive agents/actors (negative or positive disrupters, can be weak or strong)
- Self-organization
- Co-evolution

As a non-scientist with family members in the sciences, the concept of an “ecosystem” is an apt analogy for me in thinking about Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Due to their international interventions, governed by international agreements, it can be argued that in these cases, there are co-existing “ecosystems” – each a separate complex adaptive system – one of the international intervention apparatus and one of the country and its formal and informal institutions. Due to the dual “ecosystems”, each with its own complexities, this complicates an already more complicated operating context due to the changes enumerated earlier in this paper (more non-state actors, more actors active in development/governance, more donors [and rise in number and scope of emerging or South-South donors], etc.). Due to the nature of the intervention, the number of actors, and the starting point, this suggests some new elements for looking at how best to strategically and operationally approach future interventions (at the very least, so that the interventions are not the equivalent of “invasive species” that crowd out the ecosystems’ native species).

Explaining change in this context, there are two key illustrative aspects:

In thinking about both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, and the concepts of complex adaptive change, several images are helpful in further explaining why they are meaningful. In relating to the characteristics of why change might unfold in unpredictable ways over time, the topological map above is a prime example. With both fragile/weak institutions and a country undergoing change, for any one input or interaction, it might interact with any one of the map’s features and, due to a lack of deep understanding of the countries (interconnectivity and interdependence of all elements and dimensions/levels), the reactions (or feedback) may appear unpredictable and have an unexpected impact on the elements of the system that are undergoing reform/improvement, etc. Assuming that “fragile/weak” countries have more points of intersection because the formal institutions are very weak and the informal alliances and power relationships are so diverse, any one input or interaction could have an accentuated feedback/impact loop. This cascading, accentuated impact/feedback process may be even greater if it is related to “governance,” which itself has a set of embedded complexities.

A second important aspect of complex adaptive systems is the sensitivity to initial conditions. In closed, uncomplicated systems (or for tame problems), projecting outcomes is more likely to be based on predictable, linear change, with certain inputs leading to specific outputs/results. However, for open, complex adaptive systems (and wicked problems), where specific outcomes will potentially be more likely in the short term, it will be more unlikely, if not impossible, to predict the results in the longer term. It is unlikely for two reasons: first, a basic lack of understanding of the complex adaptive system itself is a genuine liability even in the short term but certainly over the longer term as the various feedback processes over the multiplicity of factors aggregate; but even if the pattern of change is generally known, even a small change in
any one characteristic of the complex system, will lead to the unpredictability over the longer term. A good analogy is weather forecast, where it is difficult to predict over the longer term due to all the factors contributing to weather. More concretely for Afghanistan, an example could be the rapid turnover of key personnel in the organizations, which could set off even more unanticipated cascading changes due to differences in leadership style and operating assumptions, degree of connection with the other actors, etc.

While completely accurate predictions over the longer term in complex adaptive systems seems unlikely, due to their nature, making more rational decisions would depend on two actions:

1) Increasing knowledge of the composition and characteristics of the networks of actors in the system. Identifying and mapping the actors in the network, at both the national and local levels, is a prerequisite. For instance, are the actors formally or informally connected? What is the pattern of interaction – more loosely connected, which could be positive in reducing the impact of any one change cascading through the system but negative if a very dominant actor due to informal or formal influence, and differential actions therefore instigate conflict; or more tightly connected, which could be either positive or negative depending on the circumstances. Other questions relate to the “denseness” of actors in any one area and the degree of differentiation of their activities. And finally, the question of whether network clusters develop, and on what basis (geographic – provincial, region, etc.; sector – rule of law, women’s empowerment, civil society, etc.; type of organization – military, PRT, non-profit, private sector, etc.).

2) Mapping the “system” on an agreed upon number of characteristics to see if there are patterns over time. While it does not analyze the relationships between each of the characteristics, it does identify areas of further research for possible correlations.

The questions:

1) Managing dynamic, complex adaptive systems: Is it possible to take advantage of the dynamic, complex adaptive system while also managing it? Is there an intersection of
“governance” of the two co-existing complex adaptive systems or ecosystems, where there is a dissonance between “traditional governance” and “network governance.” What about accountability if there is a less hierarchical world?

It is helpful to think about Afghanistan and Timor-Leste with respect to their international interventions and the two types of governance, along the lines of the experience of Calfed (California’s program to share water resource management) with 13 governance dimensions: 122

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<tr>
<td>Criterion of success</td>
<td>Attainment of goals of formal policy</td>
<td>Realization of collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System behavior</td>
<td>Determined by component participant roles</td>
<td>Determined by interactions of the participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic legitimacy</td>
<td>Representative democracy</td>
<td>Deliberative democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Related to governance, the NIC’s *Global Trends 2030* predicts that governments will increasingly turn to “‘hybrid’ coalitions of state and nonstate actors which shift depending on the challenge.” 123 If so, and as they expand, it will require attention to the

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122 David E. Booher and Judith E. Innes, “Governance for Resilience: Calfed as a Complex Adaptive Network for Resource Management,” *Ecology and Society* 15(3): Article 35 (16 pp). The California Program for Water Management (Calfed) evolved as a mechanism to address the complex water management issues in California, with diverse and conflicting mandates of multiple public organizations and well-organized stakeholder groups advocating to administrative agencies, the state legislature, the courts, and the electorate.

123 *Global Trends 2030*, p. 128.
norms governing the authorities, accountabilities, and legitimacy so that they contribute toward solutions and are not an end in and of themselves.

2) System behavior: Is this a plus or minus for the overall aims? While operating at the edge of chaos, is it beneficial to devote attention to a more optimal intersection of networks and the more rigid bureaucracies of the state/political interests? Today, these systems exist in the “shadow of hierarchy” of the nation state. Analysis of multifaceted international interventions is needed, expanding on the analysis of Taylor Seybolt about short-term humanitarian interventions, in which he describes the interplay of humanitarian aid networks in terms of working in a crisis environment and its impact on levels of collaboration/coordination, trust, and intersection of network arrangements with political interests of the donor governments. With the complex adaptive system, the key elements of a network are: complexity (number of services/activities); differentiation of services/activities (do organizations specialize or diversify to cope with resource uncertainties); stability (what is the frequency of turnover in organizations or personnel, shifting of activities or location, and entry of new and unknown organizations, leading to reduction of trust); connectivity (formal? informal? and by whom?); size of system (“as the number of organizations grows arithmetically, the number of … connections grows exponentially” and tends toward centralizing of direction and information); distribution of activities (dominance of any one actor either by resource level or scope of activity).

The behavior of the network may take one of three forms: a) exchange of information or resources; b) limited cooperation on a specified set of tasks; and c) broad cooperation on a set of activities as required to reach a commonly defined goal. He considers that external factors working against the highest functioning level of a network (broad cooperation) are the high dependence on a limited number of donors (thereby increasing competition), political interests of various donors, and the high level of uncertainty in any one conflict situation accompanied by low stability of organizations operating at any one...

124 This is discussed in the article of Eva Sorensen, “Democratic Theory and Network Governance,” Administrative Theory and Praxis (December 2002), v. 24, issue 4, 693-720, p. 694.
126 Seybolt, pp. 1034-1035.
time that leads to very low levels of trust among the actors.\textsuperscript{127} Research on tri-partite interventions (beyond only humanitarian efforts, on which Seybolt’s paper is focused) is needed, in order to verify that these networks behave in the same general ways. For international interventions, special attention should be given to the location of the annual or bi-annual meetings about assistance to the country. For instance, Timor-Leste held an annual in-country “development partners” meeting\textsuperscript{128}; for Afghanistan, the meetings were convened outside the country (e.g., London, Berlin, Istanbul, Tokyo, etc.). The degree to which the location contributes to or influences the behavior of the network, measured against the elements identified by Seybolt, could be assessed for the possible implications during the international intervention.

3) Evolving mandates over time: Comparing the two countries, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, Timor-Leste had comparatively fewer agreements over a similar period. A detailed comparison of the scope and duration of the agreements as compared to an agreed upon set of factors should be compiled, in order to reduce the possible unintended consequences of these continued “gaps.”

4) Accountability: In these circumstances, the breadth and scope of accountabilities grew and became more explicit, detailed, and comprehensive. Accountability grew to include finances, performance, and fairness and was more often to the hierarchical authority (political entity). For broad goals and objectives, accountability was to the agreement for the international intervention, either that signed by participating nations (representing both traditional and non-traditional donor states) or endorsed by the UN Security Council. Due to the duration of international engagement in both countries, and particularly Afghanistan, the political demands for “results” by legislatures and the publics in the contributing countries also acted as a deterrent to cooperation; these “results” were specific to the support of each donor country and not to the international agreement.

\textsuperscript{127} Seybolt, pp. 1045-1046.
\textsuperscript{128} As a measure of the meeting’s integration into the country’s evolving shared sense of community, it was commonly referred to by its acronym, TLDPM. See the Government of Timor-Leste, Ministry of Finance, “Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting: Background Paper,” April 7, 2010.
5) Network performance: Were the network characteristics or external factors most important in influencing the functionality or performance of networks either at the administrative or operational levels?

A Brief but Concise Overview of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste as Complex Systems:

**Afghanistan:** two overlaid but different “ecosystems” or “complex systems,” the Afghan and that of the international intervention. Both were very complex “ecosystems” due to the number and diversity of actors, levels and dimensions of engagement, and scope. Although the international intervention began in 2001, there were evolving terms of engagement as captured in various international agreements, thus creating the situation of sequential starting conditions, each with its own peculiar circumstances. Because of the number and diversity of actors, and levels and dimensions of engagement, the “system” itself evolved over time, with cascading impact on the change process itself (e.g., the announcement of withdrawal corresponded to increased attention to accountability of funds, performance, and results, at the same time as Afghans looked to survival).

**Timor-Leste:** also two different “ecosystems” or “complex systems” but the starting point was quite different. The UN initially administered the government, in which case there was no formal clash between the two “ecosystems.” As time went on, the UN transferred formal authority of more and more functions to the Government of Timor-Leste; at the same time, many international advisors remained within the ministries or agencies. Thus, there was a higher degree of “co-evolution” as this process unfolded.¹²⁹ Likewise, as compared to Afghanistan, Timor-Leste had comparatively fewer numbers of actors, and there were comparatively fewer feedback loops to negatively impact on progress.

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¹²⁹ Although Martin and Mayer-Rieckh (2005) point out areas of differing degrees of Timorese involvement under various UN mandates for engagement in Timor-Leste, along with its implications for the successive UN missions as well as for the country.
Recommendations: Next Steps for Academic Research

**Recommendation 1:** Recognize that resources of time, money, and people are limited. Therefore, more understanding of the dynamics of each complex adaptive system – and the interplay between the country undergoing international intervention and the international intervention “apparatus” need further analysis to identify the patterns. This will require multi-dimensional analysis that will enable analysts to see the “international intervention phase space” and determine if there is any pattern of equilibrium during the period of intervention. For instance, factors related to dollar amount, number of organizations, duration of agreement, and a chosen metric from the country (e.g., public perception of government performance, country’s positive future, level of corruption, or level of violence). This could be calculated for differing time periods, particularly to track any significant changes at the end of any one international agreement (e.g., for Timor-Leste, the upsurge of violence in 2006 when the then “final” UN military/political mission was ending and which then led to a new six-year mission concluding in 2012, and for Afghanistan, at the time of President Obama’s announcement of the 2014 withdrawal, etc.). For Afghanistan, and addressing governance specifically, this multi-dimensional analysis could center around the PRTs with in-built comparison due to the differing country leadership and focus/approach. Further research on the patterns of each complex adaptive system (or international intervention ecosystem) would be helpful in identifying any key factors that either seem to contribute to more stability and equilibrium, or conversely, are more destabilizing and contribute to more chaos.

**Recommendation 2:** Conduct a periodic network analysis for each country undergoing international intervention and analyze the key actors working at national and local levels. This

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131 See Eronen, ibid, where the array of arrangements is specified.
should include analysis of numbers/density, types, location, and substantive focus of the organizations, as well as of turnover and change of both personnel and organizations (either new entrants or known entities). Retrospective analysis of Timor-Leste and Afghanistan will be helpful in identifying key characteristics of network composition that will contribute to better understanding of how to improve effectiveness of the international effort. It may also reveal what level of effort could be given to improving the performance of the networks operating within the complex system, i.e., if better information sharing is the most reasonable objective (e.g., through development of an implementable “knowledge management” platform that does not necessarily require face-to-face meetings), whether there are any low-cost and time-intensive steps that could be taken to increase trust so that a more integrated, coordinated effort would lead to improved achievement of objectives, or a differentiated approach to either sectoral or geographic goals and objectives with the diverse set of actors is feasible.\footnote{Useful sources include: Keith G. Provan and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks,” \textit{Public Administration Review} (July/August 2001), v. 61, no. 414-424; Geoffrey G. Bell and Akbar Zaheer, “Networks and Knowledge Flow,” \textit{Organization Science}, Nov-Dec 2007, v. 18, no. 6, pp. 955-972; Kathleen M. Carley, “Dynamic Network Analysis,” citing her forthcoming article in the \textit{Summary of the National Research Council Workshop on Social Network Modeling and Analysis}, Ron Breiger and Kathleen M. Carley, eds., National Research Council; Robert S. Renfro, II and Dr. Richard F. Deckro, “A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government,” \textit{69th MORS Symposium, Working Group} (November 21 2001). \url{https://fas.org/irp/eprint/socnet.pdf}, accessed July 16, 2014; and Byambajav Dalaibuyan, “A Network Approach to NGO Development: Women’s NGOs in Mongolia,” \textit{The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law}, Volume 15, Issue 1, March 2013.}

Academic research expanding on the intersection of networks and hierarchies would also contribute toward a better understanding of when, where, and if better use of networks would lead to better outcomes, and if so, under what circumstances for both performance and accountability.\footnote{Ben Ramalingam’s report for the ODI, \textit{Mind the Network Gaps}, probes these questions for development workers (see pp. 5-6); application and expansion by academicians for the specific circumstances of international interventions would be beneficial. Ben Ramalingam, \textit{Mind the Network Gaps}, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2011.} Is it feasible, under the circumstances of international interventions, to give attention to evolution of the networks, so that the interactions can be modified with new actors?\footnote{Booher and Innes, ibid.} Simply due to the high number and diversity of organizations/actors in international interventions, this could be unreasonable if there are rapid and frequent changes in a network.
Related to my background working in international NGOs, this is an area of great interest. In the NGO community, coordination and collaboration are expected. With the entry of the private sector with the premise of competition into “development” and the marketization of development, alongside the entry of the military with a different mandate and ethos, the number and diversity of actors may reveal that there is such a lack of shared values (e.g., civilian / military, private sector/non-profit) and competition for resources that the network of individuals/groups can expected to be informal only or if the lack of shared values is so extreme, with limited trust, that any interactions between network members is unlikely. If so, discussion should take place about the principle of “do no harm” and a high level discussion of how to manage this dilemma should be convened to reach common understanding and agreement about how to accomplish it.

As the number of international actors, both formal (e.g., UN) and informal (e.g., G7+), increases, an analysis of this new “network” is needed. These developments, while ensuring a more diverse international system, also brings the potential for less cooperation and more competition and conflict for concrete resources of people, funding, and time, and potentially over the vision for the future, which could also impede or slow the progress toward a country’s evolving new set of norms underlying its evolving political institutions as well as of its governance (what and how things are done). How will the differences be mediated at the international level so that the challenges faced by the receiving country are not escalated even more?²

**Recommendation 3:** Regarding the governance of the international dimension of the complex adaptive system, analyze the accountabilities and how they may be in conflict or reinforcing. Any international intervention requires accountability to the endorsees (either of the international agreement or to the UN Security Council which in both cases will include the country undergoing the intervention). Are the accountabilities specified in the agreement or are they evolving at the end of each agreement period? How do these accountabilities either conflict or reinforce those specified by each donor government or entity – which may encompass the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, USAID, Australian DFAT, UK DFID and FCO, international organizations such as World Bank or UN entities, private donors, and corporate...
boards of directors. Are the new norms set out in the OECD’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile Countries and Situations* incorporated into other accountabilities or are they additive? And finally, since international interventions are likely to occur in countries covered by the new G7+ set of countries, how are the accountabilities in the “New Deal” or Global Partnership handled with the approach of addressing peacebuilding and statebuilding on a simultaneous basis? An additional area of attention is accountability and results in a complex adaptive system and for countries undergoing international intervention (i.e., not only fragile or in conflict).\(^\text{136}\)

**Recommendation 4:** The “growth industry” of indicators to measure results, leading to great increase in the amount of time and cost of gathering and evaluating data, is one area requiring attention. What is a reasonable balance in order to better confirm the results, without an excessive opportunity cost particularly in intense conflict/post-conflict situations? The second question is how to accommodate the dynamic and cascading set of changes within the complex system, and as needed, identification of indicators that reflect that dynamic and are not based on a static, linear process of change.\(^\text{137}\)

**Recommendation 5:** Recognize that international interventions are a separate complex adaptive system co-existing with the country’s own complex adaptive system. Understanding that the countries undergoing international intervention are likely to have weak formal institutions and a diversity of informal power alliances and of cultural, political, and other networks, analysis of the country’s system structure and characteristics at the national and local levels of key actors is essential. Otherwise, the potential for unintended consequences with well-intended activities and initiatives is high due to lack of understanding of underlying relationships and operating assumptions. Likewise, the actions of the international complex adaptive system must be carefully calibrated with that of the country’s system’s evolution, particularly in ensuring that the drive to develop the infrastructure of the political institutions (the form) does not outstrip the


underlying and supportive social and political development; as Huntington points out, this could be destabilizing and a source of both social and political disorder.\footnote{138} Huntington, p. xii.

**Recommendation 6:** Through the evolving system, commit to use of tools such as DFID Overseas Development Institute’s Drivers of Conflict analysis or political economy analysis, which maps how power and resources are distributed and contested, to better understand the country undergoing international intervention and to serve as a basis for the approach taken.

**Recommendation 7:** Approach the international interventions as ‘wicked problems’ that require an integrated approach to achieving viable solutions.\footnote{139} See Noah Coburn and Anna Larson and Noah Coburn, *Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. This will therefore require moving beyond the identification of areas of focus in an international agreement, which often encompass diplomacy, development, and defense/security, to looking at the links and potential contradictions between the agreed-upon goals and objectives because each as has an in-built set of complexities and contradictions. Likewise, the integrated approach must be in keeping with the concept of a “complex adaptive system” where there may be impacts in other sectors/fields. It will also require disaggregating those issues that are ‘tame’ problems where the solution is more straightforward, but also having a knowledgeable understanding of the complex system so that it is possible to identify what are more genuinely the ‘tame’ problems.\footnote{140} Frauke de Weijer, a long-time advisor in Afghanistan, has written extensively on development there. The need to reframe the approach to change in fragile countries is described in her 2012 paper: Frauke de Weijer, “Rethinking Approaches to Managing Change in Fragile Societies,” CID Research Fellow & Graduate Student Working Paper No. 58, September 2012. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/research-fellow-graduate-student-working-papers/rethinking-approaches-to-managing-change-in-fragile-states, accessed July 16, 2014.

**Recommendation 8:** Countries undergoing international intervention are likely to have been torn by conflict, war, and civil strife. As steps are taken to ensure that foreign assistance contributes to or is more in line with national development policy and strategy, another important step relates to a new national consensus during these political transitions. For Timor-Leste and
Afghanistan, there were dramatically different levels of attention to public fora and dialogues on either the country’s or a sector’s direction. In Timor-Leste, though there has been criticism about adequate public consultation, the opportunities were much greater than in Afghanistan. Admittedly, the security situation affected the potential for citizen gatherings. Yet, while both societies are similarly based on family and clan ties, the opportunities provided in Timor-Leste have provided openings for the society to formulate a new shared identity as the new state evolved. In Afghanistan, there were fewer opportunities that brought together Afghans as citizens, in a mix with other families, ethnic groups, etc., and this has slowed the progress toward a new shared, national consensus.\(^{141}\) In the author’s view, this along with other factors such as explosion in number of actors, goals and objectives, and activities, reinforced the existence of two overlapping “ecosystems” that did not necessarily help in the country’s development of its new norms of governance under the new constitution.

Not only are the national dialogues important for their contribution to a new shared consensus, with proper attention to their inclusivity (particularly bridging gender, socio-economic, political, and ethnic divides), they can also help to influence the substance of more broadly representative policy decisions taken by the country’s leadership and evolving political institutions.\(^{142}\) The additional contribution is that they serve as a form of “civic education” for citizens and can also serve as a mechanism to bring them together with government leaders and reinforce the idea of accountability and transparency.

**Recommendations: Policy Recommendations for the International System**

**Policy Recommendation 1:** Recognize the new reality of international intervention taking a “whole of government” (diplomacy, development, and defense/security) approach. To address a gap at the international level, recognizing that international compacts are generally agreed to in

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separate fora for civilian and security efforts, establish a joint forum for civilian and military/security leaders to reach strategic agreement.

**Policy Recommendation 2:** In view of the “whole of government” approach, expand consultation among the three communities to identify and agree upon ways to better manage the in-built conflicts and tensions between development and security – although the dilemmas cannot be resolved, the new paradigm for international intervention requires measures to ensure progress toward a new “operating” agreement among civilian-military actors who will continue to work simultaneously in a variety of country and regional settings.

The huge increase in the number of actors highlighted the urgent need for new modalities of cooperation and collaboration among the disparate actors, some with different agendas and mandates, operating styles, and approaches that further complicate having a “unity of effort” or at least avoiding conflicting contributions that undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the time, human, and financial resources devoted to governance. Particularly in countries where efforts to strengthen governance are simultaneous with international intervention, the traditional models of communication and collaboration do not necessarily work.

**Policy Recommendation 3:** The international system is out-stripping the international framework for official development assistance established in the aftermath of World War II. Although some non-DAC countries report statistics to the OECD’s DAC with a membership of 23 countries, it should be investigated whether the new emerging fora for aid effectiveness, in which a larger number of countries participate and are signatories (162 for the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), would be a structure for traditional and non-traditional donors to reach consensus on the new global norms governing the provision of assistance. Because the aid effectiveness fora also include over four dozen international, regional, and key philanthropic organizations, it appears that there is great potential for these more inclusive OECD fora to supersede the OECD DAC as a means of achieving many of the same aims of the post-World War II framework for accountability, transparency, and monitoring of aid flows.
Recommendations for Agreements Governing International Interventions

Agreement Recommendation 1: Future agreements should include a framework that specifies the expectations for collaboration, cooperation, and communication at working levels between civilian and military sectors, along with the mechanisms or structure for implementation at all levels. The agreements should also identify the steps to be taken to operationalize the implementation mechanism/structure beyond the senior representatives who physically participate in the joint monitoring/accountability/management boards.

Agreement Recommendation 2: Agreements should include a commitment for signatories to distribute the agreement to all relevant organizations (staff, fund recipients, partner institutions) along with clear guidance on any new steps to be taken by those funded by or collaborating with the signatory in order to meet the goals and objectives of the agreement.

Agreement Recommendation 3: Future agreements should include the commitment to in-country approaches to ensuring citizen consultation and to creating country-relevant viable and concrete mechanisms for populations to work toward consensus on the new national vision over the longer-term. The consultation process should be assessed for conflict vulnerabilities to minimize potential for more conflict rather than less as an outcome.
Appendix I

Afghanistan international agreements

Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation (Tokyo Conference), 08/07/2012

Conclusions of the Conference on Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade (Bonn Conference), 05/12/2011

Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, 02/11/2011

Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan People and the International Community to Afghanistan (Kabul Conference), 22/07/2010

Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace Jirga, 06/06/2010

Communiqué of the Conference on Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership (London Conference), 28/01/2010

Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan (Hague Conference), 31/03/2009

Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan Convened under the Auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Moscow Declaration), 27/03/2009

Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan (Paris Conference), 12/06/2008


Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, 03/07/2007

Afghanistan Compact Building on Success (London Conference), 01/02/2006

Berlin Declaration (Berlin Conference), 01/04/2004

Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations (Afghanistan, China, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), 22/12/2002

Communiqué of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (Tokyo Conference), 22/01/2002

Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), 05/12/2001
Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan, 19/07/1999

Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord) - and Annex on the Division of Powers, 07/03/1993

Peshawar Accord, 24/04/1992

Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, 14/04/1988


Timor-Leste international agreements

United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), June – October 1999. Political mission to organize and conduct a popular consultation regarding the East Timorese people’s aspirations for special autonomy within Indonesia or rejection thereof, leading to separation from Indonesia.


United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002 – May 2005. Peacekeeping mission, with UNMISET also providing assistance until all operational responsibilities were transferred to national authorities and the country attained self-sufficiency.


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Piiparinen, Touko. “A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider’s Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.” *International Peacekeeping*. 2007. 14:1, 143-157, DOI: 10.1080/13533310601114350. [refers to the ‘clash of mindsets’ if PRTs do not clearly identify the division of labor and code of conduct – if this is not done, the clash could itself be a source of friction. Indicates that “currently, this harmony is ensured only by goodwill on the part of individuals.” P. 155.]

Stromseth, Jane, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks. *Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [the principle author, with whom I interacted in Timor-Leste, and her book looking specifically at international interventions and a key governance topic – rule of law – were very influential in my thinking about the nexus of international intervention and governance]


